From Islamophobia to Islamistophobia: framing Islamic movements in Egyptian newspapers after the January 25th Revolution by El-Haddad, Aisha Essam
American University in Cairo 
AUC Knowledge Fountain 
Theses and Dissertations 
6-1-2013 
From Islamophobia to Islamistophobia: framing Islamic 
movements in Egyptian newspapers after the January 25th 
Revolution 
Aisha Essam El-Haddad 
Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds 
Recommended Citation 
APA Citation 
El-Haddad, A. (2013).From Islamophobia to Islamistophobia: framing Islamic movements in Egyptian 
newspapers after the January 25th Revolution [Master’s thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC 
Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/998 
MLA Citation 
El-Haddad, Aisha Essam. From Islamophobia to Islamistophobia: framing Islamic movements in Egyptian 
newspapers after the January 25th Revolution. 2013. American University in Cairo, Master's thesis. AUC 
Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/998 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more 
information, please contact mark.muehlhaeusler@aucegypt.edu. 
The American University in Cairo 
 
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy  
 
 
 
From Islamophobia to Islamistophobia:   
Framing Islamic Movements in Egyptian Newspapers after  
the January 25
th
 Revolution 
 
A Thesis Submitted to 
 
The Department of Journalism and Mass Communication  
 
 
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Master of Arts 
 
 
by Aisha Essam El-Haddad 
 
 
 
 
under the supervision of Dr. Mohamad Elmasry 
September 2013 
 
  
 
ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Bism Allah AlRahman AlRaheem. In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most 
Merciful. All Thanks are due to Allah for His numerous blessings and the success that is 
only granted by Him.  
I would like to express my greatest gratitude to my adviser Dr. Mohamad Elmasry for his 
patient guidance, detailed and timely feedback, continuous encouragement, and endless 
support. I especially appreciate his willingness to give his valuable time so generously 
whenever it was needed despite the tight deadlines this thesis passed through. 
I would also like to thank my committee members: Dr. Naila Hamdy and Dr. Hussein 
Amin for accepting to be in my committee despite the very short time provided for 
reading. Their valuable critique and generous praise was very encouraging and helped 
this thesis become much better.  
I would like to thank my father, for always inspiring and believing in me, my mother, for 
her tremendous and unconditional support, my husband, for his utmost sacrifice and 
encouragement, my brothers, for always being there for me. Special thanks are extended 
to my dearest sisters–in-law for enabling a dream to come true. 
I am particularly grateful to my friend Sarah Aggour for helping me in the inter-coder 
reliability test, and for offering her assistance and solidarity all the time. 
I wish also to thank my friends Reham Atef and Radwa Fathy for providing help and 
advice in critical times.  
 
  
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study examined how Egyptian newspapers framed Egyptian Islamic movements in 
the two years following the January 25, 2011 revolution. A content analysis was 
conducted on four newspapers including the state-owned Al-Ahram and three private 
newspapers representing different levels of professionalism: Al-Masry Al-Youm, Al-
Youm Al-Sabea‘ and Al-Dostor. The total sample consisted of 197 front-page news 
articles. Results indicated that Egyptian newspapers predominantly associated Islamism 
with negative values. Among the top five frames that dominated Egyptian newspapers 
coverage of Islamists – ―anti-democracy‖, ―politically organized‖, ―violence‖, 
―polarization‖, and ―anti-revolution‖ – four were negative. The study found framing 
differences across Islamic groups, especially between the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Salafi Al-Noor party. Negative framing was more common in private newspapers scoring 
lower on professional and ethical standards. Results suggest that Islamists were already 
framed negatively before they reached power, and when their political roles changed 
framing became more negative. The study provides a reference point for future 
comparisons with the framing of Islamic movements in Egypt following the removal of 
President Mohammed Morsi on July 3, 2013. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Egyptians from all walks of life participated in the January 25, 2011 revolution 
against dictator Hosni Mubarak, an event which opened the doors for greater media 
freedom and free political competition. Egyptian media witnessed major changes during 
the period directly following the revolution. More channels and newspapers were 
established and quickly gained wide audiences, and constraints on news content 
decreased in comparison with the Mubarak era. Despite the relatively open and free 
media environment, the Egyptian news environment continued to be plagued by 
problems, including a basic lack of professionalism (Elmasry, 2013; Schleifer, 2013; 
Howaidy, 2013b). Islamists and some analysts (see Esposito, 2013; Elmasry, 2013; 
Amin, 2013, Howaidy, 2013a, Al-Majid, 2012, Ibrahim, 2012) have argued that during 
the one-year presidency of Muslim Brotherhood member Mohammed Morsi, private 
Egyptian media outlets engaged in a fierce anti-Muslim Brotherhood campaign to 
delegitimize the group (El-Amin, 2013; Elmasry, 2013; Margolis, 2013). These analysts 
have argued that portrayals of the Morsi administration, the Muslim Brotherhood and 
other Islamists were often based on rumor and exaggeration, and were sometimes devoid 
of basic standards of professional journalistic fairness and balance (Elmasry, 2013; 
Howaidy, 2011, Al-Majid, 2012). The present study used content analysis to investigate 
claims that images of Islamists were distorted by mainstream Egyptian news outlets in the 
two years following the January 25, 2011 revolution. How were Islamists framed in the 
post-revolution Egyptian media environment? Do the Egyptian media still use Mubarak-
era stereotypes in covering Islamists? What power relations does the media framing of 
Islamists reflect? 
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 Specifically, the study aimed to find out (1) which frames dominated the 
representation of Islamic groups in post-revolution Egyptian newspapers, (2) whether 
framing of Islamists differs across different types of newspaper ownership, and different 
levels of media professionalism, (3) whether framing is consistent for different Islamic 
movements, (4) whether framing differs with the political roles played by Islamists: being 
in opposition, in the new parliament, or in the presidency and the government, and (5) to 
what extent media framing of Islamists aligns with Mubarak regime discourse about 
Islamists.  
  The study is important for several reasons. First, it helps inform the debate on 
whether Egyptian media is biased against Islamists, a claim that is propagated by 
Islamists and some observers (see Esposito, 2013; Elmasry, 2013; Kirkpatrick & El-
Sheikh, 2012), but denied by the mainstream Egyptian media. Second, examining the 
framing of Islamists paves the way for investigating what effects such framing may have 
on both non-Islamist audiences and on Islamists themselves, and for a comparison of 
Egyptian and international media framing of Islamists. Third, the study helps realize how 
framing can contribute to (or discourage) violence/tolerance, polarization/collaboration, 
and thus influence the path of transition in Egypt.  
Available literature on Islamists included very few studies on how their societies - 
including the media, elite and audiences - perceive them (Utvik, 2011). In addition, most 
studies on Islamists and the media focused on violent Islamists. Few studies dealt with 
the media representation of peaceful Islamists and most of them were done on Western 
media. This study contributes to literature by examining non-violent Islamists or ‗Islamic 
democrats‘ as represented in the news media of a Muslim-majority country. 
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  The next chapter provides a background on Islamism. It is followed by a chapter 
on the situation in Egypt after the revolutions pertaining to Islamists. A brief background 
on the sampled Islamic movements proceeds, followed by a chapter on framing theory as 
the study‘s conceptual framework, then the research design and detailed description of 
the method used. And finally the results, conclusions derived, and future 
recommendations are highlighted. 
Who are Islamists? 
 Literature on Islamists can be classified to three different trends. Authors have not 
only differed in how they‘ve defined Islamism, but also and more importantly in their 
recommendations on dealing with it. Some scholars writing about Islamists have been 
described as ‗confrontationalists‘, and others as ‗accommodationists‘ (Mishra, 2008). 
Others writing about Islamism have, themselves, come from Islamist backgrounds. The 
latter group emerged from the emphasis on the need to understand Islamism within its 
own context and through its own voice. Ignoring first hand resources and analyzing 
Islamists isolated from their community and compared against Western problems and 
standards resulted in oversimplification of the phenomenon (Utvik, 2011). Much of the 
debate about Islamism might be all running within a Western orientalist approach (Martin 
& Barzegar, 2010).  
Terms and Definitions 
 The first group, the confrontationalists – or the clash of civilization school 
(Mujani & Liddle, 2004) – doesn‘t stop too much at the term used for the phenomena; for 
them all the terms are the same: Islamism equals fundamentalism, militant Islam, and 
radical Islam. Leading confrontationalists include Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington, 
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Daniel Pipes, and Robert Spencer. For example, for Pipes, Islamism is characterized by 
―three main features: devotion to sacred law, rejection of Western influence, turning faith 
into ideology‖ (Pipes, 2003, p.7). For confrontationalists, Islamism is a ‗totalitarian 
ideology‘ equated with Marxism/Leninism and fascism (Pipes, 2003). It believes that 
Islam and politics are not separated, and calls for establishing an Islamic state based on 
Shari‘a law, which (in this perspective) is an Islamic theological state (Skelly, 2010). 
They argue that the rise of Islamic movements will lead to ―…no less than a clash of 
civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against 
our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both‖ 
(Lewis, 1990, p. 10). 
 Among the second group – the accommodationists - there is still a debate on 
which term is the most suitable to describe Islamic movements, and accordingly which 
definition is the best to include all the varieties among Islamists (see Martin & Barzegar, 
2010). Well known accomodationists include John Esposito, Noah Feldman and David 
Emmerson. An ongoing debate amongst accomodationists discusses diverse definitions 
and multiple terms, but all of these scholars and analysts seem to share a willingness to 
accept and engage with Islamists. Bayat (2005) gathered the different terms used for 
Islamism like 'Islamic fundamentalism', 'Islamic movements',  'political  Islam',  'Islamic  
activism',  'Islamic  revivalism'  or 'resurgence' (p. 893). He argued that Islamic 
fundamentalism has now been replaced by other terms, the latest of which is Islamism. 
‗Islamic movements‘ excludes independent Islamist thinkers and believers who don‘t 
officially affiliate with the movements. ‗Political Islam‘ implies that Islam is being 
politicized, is being transformed to a political ideology, thus it is refused by Islamists who 
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argue that Islam as a religion deals with all aspects of life, and also by observers who 
argue that Islamic social movements were not built primarily for politics (Brown, 2013). 
‗Islamic Activism‘ was proposed by Bayat (2005) to describe all ―extra-ordinary 
religiosity of the Muslim population in modern times [including] active  piety,  as 
exemplified  in  trends  and  movements  which  centre  on  individual  self- enhancement 
and identity‖ (p. 894), but if it is engaged mainly with politics then it is ‗Islamism‘. 
 Emmerson (2010) argued for using Islamism because it allows adding different 
adjectives including non-violent, moderate and democratic Islamists beside violent, 
illiberal or authoritarian. He amended an earlier definition of Islamists by James Piscatori 
to be ―Muslims who are committed to public action to implement what they regard as an 
Islamic agenda, Islamism is the commitment to, and the content of, that agenda‖ (p. 17). 
Emmerson asserted that Islamism is not necessarily political, but also includes ―social, 
economic, cultural and evangelical Islamists‖ (Emmerson, 2010, p.29). Unlike Bayat, he 
excluded personal piety, limiting Islamism to collective and public action. 
 On the other hand, Variso (2010) argued against using the terms Islamism and 
fundamentalism because they both imply a ―pejorative connotation‖ (p.38). 
Fundamentalists and moderates are classifications derived from Western experience with 
fundamental Christians, and cannot be applied to Islamic context because ―every Muslim 
believes in the fundamentals of Islam‖ (Ahmed, 1999; Variso, 2010). From Variso‘s 
perspective, then, using the term Islamism implies a desire to understand Islam in light of 
the experience of Christianity in the West where the church and the state are separated. 
This is problematic, because in this sense, if a Muslim is not secular according to the 
Western standards then he/she should be an Islamist, which is not the case among 
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Muslims. Variso suggested replacing these words with adjectives for Muslims like 
militants Muslims, democratic Muslims or using more neutral words like revivalism and 
resurgence. 
 Fuller (2010) believed the problem is not in the term, but on how ‗Islamism‘ is 
selectively used in the West to highlight bad Muslims. He defined Islamists as those who 
believe that Islam has something to say about the political and social order of society and 
who seek to implement this view in some way (Fuller, 2003, p. xi). He asserts that 
Muslims do not agree on what role Islam should have in political and public life. 
Armajani (2012) offered a more specific definition of Islamists as those who believe that 
the truth of Quran and its legal manifestation in Shari‘a should govern the lives of 
Muslims and also non-Muslims living in Muslim countries. They believe that ―Islam 
should dictate every aspect of live, personal or societal‖ (p.1), that it is the true religion 
and other religions are false, and that western lifestyle is antithetical to Islam. 
 Another set of accommodationists‘ definitions focused on the solutions proposed 
by Islamists to different societal problems. Martin and Barzegar (2010) used Islamism to 
refer to ―Muslim social movements and attitudes that advocate the search of more purely 
Islamic solutions to the political, social and economic problems of contemporary life‖ (p. 
2). Zahid and Medley (2006) defined Islamism as ―politics which  promotes systems  of 
governance and political solutions  in terms of religious doctrine  rather than,  say,  
utilitarian considerations,  or  the  supposed  interests  of  classes  or  nations.‖ (p. 693).  
 An examination of the ideas of the Muslin Brotherhood, one of the biggest 
Islamic movement in Egypt (see the chapter on Egyptian Islamic movements which starts 
on page 18), by Rutherford (2006) led him to coin a new term: ‗Islamic constitutionalism‘ 
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which adopts many liberal governance ideas including constraints on state power, 
government accountability, and protection of civil and political right, but differs with 
liberalism in aspects like the role of law, individual role in society and state purpose. 
 For Islamists, Islamism is the true nature of Islam. Hassan Al-Banna, the founder 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, believed Islam to be a comprehensive system that tackles 
every aspect of life including law and governance, economy and culture, family and 
society, besides belief and worship (Al-Banna, n.d.). Thus Islamism is: 
―an intellectual, moral, societal, economic, political and inter-state movement that 
is based on Islam as the main reference point and aims for a new conception of the 
person, society, politics/state and thus a new model of social organization and 
universal Islamic Union. In other words, it is Islam coming to life, following its 
authority and ideals, with the intention of it to be established in every historical and 
societal condition in the world.‖ (Bulac, 2012).   
 According to this perspective, every Muslim should naturally be an Islamist, and 
if not, there is a problem with his or her understanding of the religion (Bulac, 2012). In 
the view of Bulac, himself a Turkish Islamist, those who find difficulty in recognizing 
Islamism as Islam reduce the meaning of religion to devoutness, focusing only on faith 
and worship, and allowing for secularism, which is not ‗true‘ Islam (Bulac, 2012).  
 Based on the idea that there is no Islamism but true Islam, Islamists have rarely 
used the term Islamism but instead used adjectives like Muslim and Islamic. Sayyid Qutb, 
an influential Egyptian Islamist, announced the extinction of ‗the Muslim community‘ 
which he identified as ―a group of people whose manners, ideas and concepts, rules and 
regulations, values and criteria, are all derived from the Islamic source‖ (p. 4).  According 
to Qutb, the (true) Muslim community ―vanished at the moment the laws of God became 
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suspended on earth‖ (p. 4), and it is the role of every Muslim to revive it. A closer term 
was used by the Indian Islamist Abu Al-Ala Al-Maudodi, who argued that ―It is… 
inconceivable that any Muslim society worth the name can deliberately adopt a system of 
life other than the Shari‘ah. If it does so, its contract is ipso facto broken and the whole 
society becomes ‗un-Islamic‖ (Al-Mawdudi, n.d., p. 4) 
 In the Islamist‘s view, Islamism is a new word only coined to illustrate the 
difference between Islamists and non-Islamist Muslims (Martin & Barzegar, 2010). Some 
current Islamists and analysts prefer to use different terms to illustrate that difference like 
‗Islamic democrats‘ (Rutherford, 2006; Gehad El-Haddad, Spokesperson of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, personal communication, April 15, 2013) to refer to Islamists who accepted 
the basic rules of democracy and got involved in democratic processes, without believing 
in secularism.  
 Reasons for Islamism 
 The three groups have different interpretations for why Islamic movements 
emerged. It is a reaction to modernity in the view of confrontationalists; an anti-modern 
ideology that resulted from poverty (Clawson, 2010) or was a consequence of 
―frustration, and a deeply bruised sense of identity‖ (Pipes, 2003, p.5). According to this 
group, early roots of the phenomena can be traced to the early history of Islam, not as a 
religion but in the tribal culture in which Islam emerged (Salzamn, 2010). Thus Islamism 
is also a pre-modern traditional ideology adopted by poor people who were untouched by 
modernity (Mujani & Liddle, 2004). In this ―modernist‖ view, Islamism is a reaction to 
Western modernization, carried out by traditional people, scholars and the urban poor 
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(Bayat, 2005, p. 894). Consequently, this perspective explains the ―modernity‖ of some 
Islamists as the inescapable Western influence on them (Pipes, 2003).  
 The accommodationists view Islamism as ―the manifestation of, and a reaction to, 
post-modernity… a quest for difference, cultural autonomy, alternative polity and 
morality vs. the universalizing secular modernity‖ (Bayat, 2005, p. 894). Islamism in this 
sense is an answer to the failure of Western modernity, to propose that Islam is the 
solution for society problems which Western systems and ideas including socialism, 
communism and secularism failed to solve (Martin & Barzegar, 2010). Although this 
approach made clear Islamism is a new phenomenon, it doesn‘t dismiss its roots in 
Islamic tradition and history which have long included groups and trends that could be 
labeled today as Islamists (Martin & Barzegar, 2010). As a consequence, Islamists cannot 
be defined as anti-Western because they were not only a result of colonial and post-
colonial experiences. Kamali (2012) explained how many Islamists reject Westernization 
while believing in modernity. There is no single modernity model. The globalization of 
the phenomenon led to several paths to modernity, even in the West itself. Hence, 
Westernization and modernization are not the same. Moreover, Armajani (2012) 
suggested that Islamism is not post-modernity but, itself, one of the modernity ideologies 
in Muslims world. As she explains, Islamists never rejected change, they only bounded it 
with Shari‘ah. 
 Islamists also provided explanations, not for the existence of Islamism as they 
believe it is the true understanding of Islam, but for the emergence of Islamic movements 
in the 19
th
 century. According to Al-Banna (n.d.) and Al-Qaradawi (2003) the main 
reasons for establishing Islamic movements was that Muslims departed from the practice 
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of true Islam. Three factors led to this result: autocratic rulers in Muslim states, 
colonization, and the fall of the Islamic Caliphate in 1924 (Al-Qaradawi, 2003). The 
Muslim Ummah (nation) was divided into states which fought against each other, Islamic 
law or Shari’a was replaced by colonists with man-made laws, and the ―materialistic 
ideology‖ of the Western civilization became the source of influence in Muslim lives 
instead of the Islamic civilization which combined soul and matter (Al-Qaradwi, 2003). 
Bulac (2012) argued that, despite its mistakes and divergence from Islam, the Ottoman 
Empire embodied Islamism because ‗Islam was its founding ideology‘ and the source of 
its legitimacy as the Islamic Caliphate, thus, it could have been reformed. Instead, when it 
was defeated, elites seeking a meaningful order turned to the West and to Islam. In this 
view, Islamism is an authentic phenomenon derived from the sources of Islam, and at the 
same time a modern ideology that emerged to provide solutions for the challenges facing 
Muslims today. Therefore, it should not be defined in anti-Western or anti-modern terms, 
it is beyond both.  
 Islamism relation to Islam 
 One of the most problematic aspects in explaining Islamism is its relation to 
Islam. Even Islamists differ in this regard, but most peaceful Islamists agree that Islam is 
‗pluralistic within itself‘ (BULAÇ, 2012, p.80). Thus each Islamic movement present or 
adopt a certain understanding of Islam. According to Al-Banna (n.d.), this interpretation 
remains human and is separated from the sacred sources of Islam; the Qur‘an and Prophet 
Mohammed sayings and deeds. Thus all possible interpretations are human attempts 
subject to change and modifications and are welcomed as long as they do not contradict 
the sacred sources. Islamists realize that many of their differences are due to possible 
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different interpretations of Islam. Although most of Islamists believe in this plurality, 
some extreme violent groups believe that Muslims who don‘t adhere to their 
interpretation of Islam are infidels, and claim this as a justification to use violence against 
them (Lynch, 2010). 
 The confrontationalists differentiate Islamism from Islam as a religion because 
Islamism aims to impose a new order (Lewsi, 1990; Pipes, 2003). But at the same time 
they believe Islam as a religion need to be reformed to reconcile with democracy and 
modernity (Skelly, 2010). They propose ―enlightened‖ Islam, as opposed to Islamism, 
which is the result of ―Islam conflict with modernity‖ and which can save Islam from 
Islamism (Skelly, 2010, p. 11). 
 The accommodations relate Islamism to Islam. They realize that the ideas and 
practices of Islamists have been always visible in Islamic history in groups seeking to 
―implement the Qur‘anic injunction of ‗Command Right and Forbid Wrong‘ (Martin & 
Barzegar, 2010, p. 10). 
Difference between Islamists   
 The clash of civilizations school believes that it is not possible to reasonably 
distinguish Islamists from each other (Pipes, 2003). In their view all Islamists are a 
problem, there are no moderate Islamists, and all Islamists have the same goals and only 
differ in means. Islamism is terrorism and it is the enemy that should be confronted. It is a 
threat to both Muslims and the world (Pipes, 2003). 
 Accommodationists realized that Islamists have some things in common but that 
they also differ in many other respects. Bayat (2005) argued that all Islamists believe that 
Islam is a part of public life, they all advocate some change in the social and political 
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order, and they use similar rhetoric and dress codes. All Islamists seek a state governed 
by Shari‘ah law, but this latter is open to a lot of interpretations among Muslims (Fuller, 
2010). They also disagree on the means to achieve an Islamic society (Bayat, 2005).  
Islamists can then be classified according to many criteria including party or/and 
movement, open or closed, pragmatic or rigid, peaceful or violent, and democratic or 
authoritarian (Fuller, 2010, p.52). So when speaking of Egyptian Islamism, one would 
need to specify whether violent Islamists are meant or moderate ‗reformists‘ like the 
Muslim Brotherhood (Bayat, 2005; Rutherford, 2006; Lynch, 2009; ), Al-Azhar scholars, 
Islamic welfare organizations like Al-Gamiyya Al-Shariya which until recently had 
nothing to do with politics, or independent Islamic intellectuals (Bayat, 2005). Zahid and 
Medley (2006), in their study of the Egyptian and Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, 
concluded that ―religious ideology can be taken in different directions, according to 
circumstances, even among organizations that share a common root‖ (p.704). But these 
variations remain poorly understood by outsiders, who do not realize that context is more 
influential than ideology in the development of Islamism (Hroub, 2010). To understand 
the context of current Egyptian Islamic movements, it is important to review events in 
Egypt after the revolution. 
Egypt after the Revolution 
 On January 25th 2011, Egyptians from all walks of life gathered in squares 
demanding ―Freedom, Dignity, and Social Justice‖. For 18 days they stood still until 
Mubarak stepped down and delivered authority to the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (SCAF). The post-revolution actors can be classified into three groups: the 
military, the old regime, and the revolutionaries who, at least originally, included all 
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Egyptians supportive of the revolution and not affiliated with the old regime. There was 
an agreement on the main steps in the transitional phase towards democracy, but actors 
differed in the priorities of these steps (Awad, 2013). Just few months after Mubarak was 
toppled, disagreements developed into increased polarization. Egypt was depicted as 
being divided to two camps: secularists and Islamists, despite convergence and a wide 
range of actors in the middle.  
March 2011 Referendum 
 Right after Mubarak overthrow, SCAF suspended the 1971 constitution and 
appointed a committee of seven members to propose constitutional amendments that 
would govern the transitional period.  A referendum was carried out on March 19
th
, 2011 
on twelve amendments which proposed holding parliamentary elections, then witness the 
parliament‘s election of a 100-members Constituent Assembly to write the new 
constitution, followed by presidential elections. It also proposed full judicial supervision 
over elections and lifted previous constraints on nomination for presidency. Supporters of 
the amendments perceived it as the shortest way to get the military out of authority for the 
first time in 60 years through holding elections. Opponents believed the amendments 
would open the way to use the unlimited powers of the president in the 1971 constitution 
although there was no reference to that in the proposed articles. Opponents also 
demanded that the constitution be written before a president is elected so he cannot use 
his powers to hinder the political transition. They also demanded the delay of 
parliamentary elections to allow new movements and parties to build popular bases.  
Most Islamists supported the amendments, along with some youth groups and secular 
activists (Awad, 2013). The amendments were passed with 77% of the votes and the 
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SCAF issued a constitutional declaration that included the amendments and some other 
articles on SCAF‘s and government‘s authorities (ANHRI, 2012). 
Clashes between the military and protestors 
 During the SCAF-run interim period, many demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins 
were dispersed violently by the army (Maher, Eskandar, & Ali, 2013). Violent Clashes 
between military police and protestors took place in July 2011, October 2011, November 
2011, December 2011 and again in May 2012 and led to many deaths and injuries (Awad, 
2013). The most famous incidents are the Maspero Clashes – October 9th, 2011, 
Mohammed Mahmoud Clashes in November, 2011, Cabinet Headquarters Clashes in 
December, 2011 and, finally, the Abasiayya clashes on May 2012. Although Islamists 
participated in some protests during the SCAF period, Islamists, including the Muslim 
Brotherhood, were largely absent and did not participate in most of the clashes at which 
protesters were massacred. Liberal revolutionary groups accused the Muslim Brotherhood 
of having abandoned the revolution, while the Brotherhood argued that participation in 
protests would provide SCAF with excuses to delay handing power to civilians through 
free and fair elections (Sabry, 2011). 
Parliamentary Elections 
 Elections for the People‘s Assembly – the lower house of parliament – were held 
from November 2011 to January 2012, followed by elections for the Shura Council (the 
upper house of parliament). The elections were perceived to increase polarization (Awad, 
2013) although most electoral coalitions included Islamic and secular parties. The 
Democratic Alliance led by the Muslim Brotherhood‘s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) 
included secular parties like Al-Karama party led by presidential candidate Hamdeen 
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Sabbahi, Ghad Al-Thawra, and 9 other parties (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2011).  The 
Democratic Alliance won 46% of the votes in the People‘s Assembly election. The 
Islamic Coalition led by the Salafi Al-Nour party, the political arm of the Salafi Call (see 
chapter on Egyptian Islamic Movements which starts on page 18), included Al-Asala and 
Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyy parties, and won 23% of the seats. The liberal Al-Wafd party 
won 8% of the seats. The Egyptian Bloc – which included secular parties the Egyptian 
Social Democratic Party, the Free Egyptians Party, and Al-Tagammu‘ Party – won 7% of 
the seats (Shaaban, M., Tantawy, S., & Ali, A., 2012; Carnegie, 2012).  Results of the 
Shura council were similar in that Islamist parties won a majority of seats.  
Constituent Assemblies 
 In March 2012, the two houses of parliament elected 100 members for the 
Constituent Assembly reflecting the different weights of political parties in the 
parliament. Secularists objected and later withdrew from the assembly, which was 
dissolved in April 2012 by the Supreme Administrative Court because it included 
members of parliament who should have selected members from outside parliament, not 
from among themselves. A second Constituent Assembly was elected in June 2012 upon 
an agreement between Islamists, non-Islamists, and the military (Elmasry, 2013). Some 
parties began boycotting the assembly by the end of September 2012 (Ahram Online, 
2012b), and some liberal members withdrew in late November, after most of the 
constitution was written. Missing members were substituted by previously elected 
alternates. The assembly finished its work amid controversy in November 2012 (Ahram 
Online, 2012c).  
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Presidential Election 
 Presidential elections took place in May 2012. After the disqualification of a 
number of candidates by the Presidential Elections Committee (PEC), including Hazem 
Abu Ismail and the Brotherhood‘s first choice, Khairat El-Shater, the competition rested 
between six major candidates. In the first round, Mohammed Morsi of the Brotherhood 
got 24.5% of the vote, Ahmed Shafiq, last Prime Minister under Mubarak and believed-
to-be the military candidate, received 23.7%, Hamdeen Sabbahi, a Nasserist got 22%, 
AbdelMoniem Abu ElFotoh, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, received 
19%, and Amr Moussa, former Foreign Minister under Mubarak, came away with 11% 
(Awad, 2013). In the second round runoff between Morsi and Shafiq, polarization 
sharpened between the two camps. Some non-Islamist parties and movements supported 
Morsi, who ended up with a narrow victory, securing 51.7% of the votes, becoming the 
first ever democratically-elected civilian President in Egypt.  
 Before the second round of the presidential elections, the Supreme Constitutional 
Court (SCC) dissolved the People‘s Assembly in June 2012 on the basis that its election 
law was unconstitutional. SCAF also issued a complementary constitutional declaration 
revoking legislative powers. The rapidity of the process was surprising when compared 
with previous cases (Awad, 2013). SCAF also gave themselves or 20 members of the 
Constituent Assembly the right to challenge its outcome in front of the Constitutional 
Court if it contradicted with the ‗goals of the revolution‘. These moves attempted to strip 
the coming president from many powers and preserve a political role for SCAF after the 
president was elected (Awad, 2013).  
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Morsi’s Constitutional Declaration and the Referendum on the Constitution 
 After an attack on an Egyptian Border Post in August 2012 that led to the death of 
16 soldiers, President Morsi dismissed the head of SCAF, General Hussein Tantawi, and 
his deputy, appointed a new defense minister, General Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi, and canceled 
the Complementary Constitutional Declaration with which SCAF held legislative 
authorities (Awad, 2013).  Morsi tried to restore the People‘s Assembly, but the SCC 
deemed his decision unconstitutional, and consequently legislative powers remained with 
him. Morsi issued a controversial constitutional declaration on November 22, 2012 with 
which he made his decisions immune from judicial challenges until the pass of the 
constitution, and protected both the second Constituent Assembly and the Shura Council 
from being dissolved by the judiciary. He also appointed a new Prosecutor General, 
Talaat Abdallah, who started re-trials of Mubarak regime figures (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 
2012a). The move was opposed by many political forces and demonstrations were held in 
Tahrir Square and outside the Presidential Palace. Violent clashes erupted outside the 
presidential palace on December 5, 2012 between protesters who supported and opposed 
the declaration, and a number of protestors were killed, most of them from the Muslim 
Brotherhood (HRW, 2012; Sobhy, 2012; CNN, 2013). In addition to the presidential 
palace clashes, Muslim Brotherhood offices, including its headquarters, were attacked 
(Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2012c). After a national dialogue on December 8, 2012 attended by 
56 political figures (Al-Shorouk, 2012), Morsi amended the declaration reinstating 
judicial reviews of his decisions (Egypt Independent, 2012c). Some political groups, 
including the National Salvation Front (NSF) – the main opposition bloc at the time – 
boycott the national dialogue, remained dissatisfied with the changes, and continued 
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protests (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2012b). The President called for another national dialogue, 
but the NSF again refused to participate (Egypt Independent, 2013). At the same time, the 
Constituent Assembly finished the drafting process and the referendum was held in late 
December 2012. The draft constitution was approved by 64% of voters in what was 
viewed as the second round of the political battle between Islamists and Secularists 
(Afify, 2012). Voter turnout, however, was just 33% (Abou ElFath, Hasan &Al-
Ghoniemy, 2012). After the referendum, the opposition organized several demonstrations 
against Morsi, which were characterized by increased violence, not only between police 
and protestors, but also between Morsi supporters and opponents (Egypt Independent, 
2013).  
Egyptian Islamic Movements 
 The Egyptian political scene after the revolution witnessed a dramatic increase in 
the number of political parties and movements, and several Islamist-oriented parties 
emerged. Islamic parties and movements in Egypt can be classified along a spectrum 
from conservatives to relatively liberal. The most prominent conservative parties are Al-
Binaa‘-w-Al-Tanmia (the Construction and Development) party of Al-Gama‘a Al-
Islamiyya and Al-Salam-w-Al-Tanmia (The Peace and Development) party of Al-Jihad 
organization. Both were previously militant organizations and abandoned violence in the 
1990s (Brown, 2013). Also among the conservatives are the Salafi parties Al-Nour (The 
light), Al-Asala (the Authenticity), and Al-Fadelia (The Virtue) (Shehata, 2012) in 
addition to the recent Al-Watan (The Homeland) established by former Al-Nour 
members. The newest in the Islamists spectrum is Al-Raya (The Flag) party established 
by former presidential candidate Hazem Abu Ismail who is also the leader of The Ummah 
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Alliance which comprises other small Islamic parties (AbdelKader, 2013). The Muslim 
Brotherhood can be described as ‗centrist‘ in the Islamic political spectrum (Lynch, 2010, 
p. 469). Al-Wasat (The Center) and Misr Al-Qawiya (The Strong Egypt) parties are 
established by former Brotherhood members and are classified as liberal Islamists (Awad 
2013). Al-Hadara (The Civilization) party recently merged with Al-Wasat (Hasan, 2013). 
This study will focus on the framing of Islamic parties and groups in general and of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi Call in particular. 
The Muslim Brotherhood 
 The Muslim Brotherhood is a general reform movement with a comprehensive 
vision that includes political, social, economic, cultural, charitable and educational 
aspects (Brown, 2013). The Muslim Brotherhood is an internally diverse and moderate 
‗centrist‘ movement (Lynch, 2010). To the MB, Islam is a comprehensive way of life, 
with politics as part of it. For the MB, a Muslim isn‘t a devout Muslim unless he is 
engaged in politics and cares for his country, the Muslim Ummah and humanity 
(Helbawy, 2010). The Muslim Brotherhood believe in gradual reform (Lynch, 2010; Al-
Anani & Malik, 2013). They practice daw’a, or preaching, to achieve seven goals; to 
reform the self (or the Muslim individual), build the Muslim family, guide the society 
towards Islam, liberate homeland from foreign occupation, reform the government to 
become an Islamic government ―performing as a servant to the nation [and] in the interest 
of the people‖, restoring ―the international prominence of the Muslim Ummah‖, and 
finally guiding humanity through spreading Islam‘s call worldwide (Al-Banna, n.d.).  
 The Brotherhood is usually described as the biggest Islamic movement, with like-
minded organizations in seventy countries (Al-Qaradawi, 2003; Lynch, 2010).  
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According to Lynch (2010), the Global Muslim Brotherhood ―exists only notionally‖ (p. 
468). The MB is known for its well-organized structure (Brown, 2013, p.2). 
 Hassan Al-Banna established the MB in 1928 as an ‗Islamic nationalist 
movement‘ (Harris, 1964).  Egypt at the time was amid a national struggle for 
independence from the British colonization, and was searching for solutions for to its 
social and economic problems (Harris, 1964).  Westernization was taking place only in 
values and morals not in sciences, education or administration. Islamic law Shari’a was 
replaced by colonists with man-made laws. The Islamic Caliphate was disintegrated to 
small states fighting each others, while Palestine was promised for the Jews (Helbawy, 
2010).  
 The MB was constrained in Egypt under the monarchy, the British occupation, 
Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak (Zahid & Medley, 2006). In times of relief they gained 
conditional licensing, but each time they were close to power they were harshly repressed 
(Awad, 2013).  
 The Brotherhood got involved in politics as early as 1941. To Al-Banna, political 
participation was part of practicing Islam (Al-Banna, n.d.). When Al-Banna attempted to 
run for elections in 1942, he withdrew due to threats by the then-Prime Minister to 
dissolve the Brotherhood. In 1945, the Brothers ran but didn‘t win, with widespread 
claims that the government rigged elections (Zahid & Medley, 2006). 
 The Muslim Brotherhood‘s popularity in the 1940s was due to their involvement 
in national liberation, fighting against the British occupation in Egypt, and in Palestine in 
1948. As a result, the Egyptian government, encouraged by the British, began a 
crackdown on the MB, arresting them and canceling their newspaper license. A judge 
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involved in the sentences against MB was assassinated. Al-Banna condemned the act and 
announced the assassins were ‗nor brothers, nor Muslims‘ (Helbawi, 2010), but some 
critics of the Brotherhood have continued to blame the group for the assassination. Prime 
Minister Al-Nuqrashi issued a military order in December 1948 banning the MB and 
confiscating all its properties. Members were fired from their jobs and arrested (Helbawy, 
2010). Only al-Banna was left free to be assassinated in 1949 (Al-Qaradawi, 2003).  
 The MB supported the 1952 Free Officers revolution in Egypt (Lynch, 2010), and 
Gamal Abdel-Nasser – the later president of Egypt – was claimed to be one of several 
MB members among the Free Officers (Helbawy, 2010). Later, disagreements between 
the MB and Nasser turned into major repression against the movement, which was forced 
to go underground (Lynch, 2010). By 1953, almost all movement members were detained 
in military prisons. After a short period of democratic resolutions in March 1954, Nasser 
returned to a more dictatorial style of governance. A failed attempt to assassinate Nasser 
in Alexandria in 1954 led to another major crackdown on the MB, despite the fact the 
Brotherhood denied any association with the assassin. Six MB members received death 
sentences from a military court and were executed (Helbawy, 2010). The MB was the 
target of a similar wave of repression in 1965, when thousands of male and female 
members were arrested. Seven leaders, including the famous intellectual Sayyid Qutb, 
were given death sentences by a military court and executed, while others received life 
imprisonment. Many members were tortured in military prisons without trails (Zahid & 
Medley, 2006). 
 In 1970, Nasser died and Sadat took over and introduced some political reforms 
permitting political parties and releasing some Brotherhood members. The following five 
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years witnessed an increase in the popularity of what was called Al-Jama‘a Islamiyya 
(The Islamic Group) among university students (Kepel, 2002). This overarching Islamic 
movement divided later into three groups; the first group joined the Brotherhood, the 
second group established the Salafi Call in Alexandria, and the third group developed 
what is known as Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya and the Al-Jihad organization, which later got 
involved in political violence (Kepel, 2002; Helbawy, 2010). After the Camp David 
Accord, Sadat faced opposition with repression. He arrested Egyptians from all walks of 
life, including members of the MB. He was assassinated in 1981 by members of the Al-
Jihad organization.  
 Through the 1980s and early 1990s under Mubarak rule, the new generation that 
joined the Muslim Brotherhood managed to win the elections of almost all professional 
syndicates and university student unions (Rutherford, 2006; Kepel, 2002). The MB 
fought against corruption and enhanced management (Zahid & Medley, 2006). By the 
mid 1990s, the Brotherhood began defining their political positions on several issues 
including women and minorities rights, and political competition. Rutherford (2006) 
argued that they developed ―a moderate and conciliatory political agenda, however, the 
regime was not in the mood to listen‖ (p. 720). Bamyeh (2013) argued that the 
Brotherhood clearly adopted the principles of the civil state. However, the regime reacted 
by restraining student unions and professional syndicates through legislations 
(Rutherford, 2006). In 1995, Mubarak began another crackdown on the MB (Kepel, 
2002). Many Brothers were sentenced by military courts in 1995, 2000, 2001 and 2007. 
In total, around 50 thousand Brotherhood members were arrested during the Mubarak era 
(Ahram, 2013). 
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 At the beginning of 2000s, leaders who were jailed in 1995 were released 
(Rutherford, 2006). A new General Guide for the Brotherhood was elected in 2004. In 
2005 the regime allowed a relatively free election. For the first time the Brotherhood 
campaigned with its own name. They also published a reform initiative and a campaign 
platform (Rutherford, 2006). The Brotherhood participated with Kifaya and other 
political groups in the protests against Mubarak policies (AbdelMoniem, 2011) which 
intensified after 2005. 
 From 1980 to 2010, The Muslim Brotherhood ran for elections. They entered 
political coalitions with the liberal Al-Wafd party in 1984, and Al-‗Amal and Al-Ahrar 
parties in 1987 when their alliance won 56 seats (Sarhan, 2005). The Brothers ran as 
independent in 1995, 2000, 2005 (in 1990 they boycott the elections) (Helbawy, 2010). In 
2005, they gained 88 from the 444 people‘s assembly seats, despite election fraud (Zahid 
& Medley, 2006). In the last elections before the revolution in 2010, the NDP is widely 
believed to have rigged elections (AP, 2010) and prevented almost all opposition groups, 
including the MB, from entering parliament. This was considered as one of the main 
causes that led to January 25
th
 revolution (Al-Khodairy, 2013). 
 The Muslim Brotherhood are criticized by some analysts and scholars for their 
reported lack of clarity on critical issues like ―Sharia law, religious identity, universal 
citizenship,… women‘s rights‖ and minorities‘ rights (Hamzawy, Ottoway  & Brown, 
2007; Rashwan, 2013). They are also accused of the lack of self-criticism (Rashwan, 
2013) and for allegedly considering themselves as the sole representatives of Islam 
(Hasan, 2013). They have been blamed for seeking to preserve their organization more 
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than anything else (Hasan, 2013), but other scholars, including Emad Shahin (2012), 
attributed this concern over survival to the oppression the Brotherhood faced. 
 In the two years following the Egyptian revolution, the movement became 
increasingly politicized (Brown, 2013). Other brotherhood activities – such as charitable 
work – still exist but are less noticeable. According to the Brotherhood themselves, they 
were ―changing from being an introvert organization locked into survival mode, to an 
extrovert organization that is leading the new Egypt‖ (Marroushi, 2012). 
 Egyptian successive regimes have always used the media to distort the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Kepel, 2002; Lynch, 2009; Helbawy, 2010; Brown, 2013). Their 
accusations ranged from backing extremism and terrorism to treason and conspiracy with 
foreign countries. The media under Mubarak often covered the Brotherhood in security 
news on arrests and extremism (Rayman, 2013). Moreover, State-media framed the 
Egyptian revolution as a conspiracy designed by the Muslim Brotherhood and other 
external powers (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). Furthermore and despite the fact the Egyptian 
media were freer after the revolution compared to any time in Egypt‘s modern history, 
arguments of continuous media bias against the MB were increasing (Al-Majid, 2012; 
Esposito, 2013; Elmasry, 2013; Amin, 2013; Howaidy, 2013a; El-Amin, 2013; Margolis, 
2013). 
The Salafi Call 
 The word “Salafi” may refer to two things: first, from the Arabic word Al-Salaf 
Al-Saleh the ‗pious forefathers‘ to refer to the understating of Islam through the practice 
of the first three generations in Islam (Lacroix, 2012), in this sense most of the Sunni 
Muslims are Salafi. Second, Salafism is a conservative Islamic global trend characterized 
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by literal understanding of Islam, emphasis on creed, and strict practice.  It comprise 
many Islamic movement, and can be classified to three major currents: the quietist current 
that practice da‘wa only, the political current that use political means to push its reform 
agenda, and the violent current that believes in the use of force as a mean of reform, 
sometimes even against Muslims (Meijer, 2010).  
 The Salaifs became popular in Egypt in the 1990s when Mubarak was fighting 
against violent Islamists and harshly oppressing the Brothers. Salafis charitable networks 
flourished throughout Egypt, especially in the poor areas (Al-Anani & Malik, 2013). 
Most of the Egyptian Salafis were quietist before the revolution, believing in the 
complete obedience to the ruler, delegitimizing partisanship, and criticizing other Islamic 
groups for engaging in politics (Al-Anani & Malik, 2013). But many turned to political 
participation afterwards.  
 Al-Da‘wa Al-Salafiyya (The Salafi Call) is the most politically influential group 
among Salafis, and the founder of Al-Noor party which came next in the People‘s 
Assembly elections after the Brotherhood. The Salafi call was established in 1970s by a 
group of university students in Alexandria who split from the then non-violent Al-Jam‘a 
Al-Islamiyya. The reason was ideological differences. (Al-Anani & Malik, 2013). 
  According to Lynch (2010), the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis believe in 
the comprehensiveness of Islam, want the state to be governed by Shari‘a and share a 
desire to reform society according to Islam (p. 470). On the other hand, Brown (2013) 
illustrated three differences between the Salafis and the Brotherhood. First, Salafis lean 
more to literal interpretations of Shari‘a texts. Unlike the Brotherhood who thinks that 
many possible interpretations to the texts are correct, the Salafis seek the one correct 
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interpretation (Brown, 2013). Second, Salafis are less engaged with the wider society 
unlike the Brotherhood who long before the revolution sought to run for election in 
professional syndicates and universities in addition to parliament. Salafis believed in 
change through preaching and leading by model, they are ―more of a society apart‖ 
(Brown, 2013, p.4). Third, Salafis lack the organizational structure and discipline that the 
Brotherhood have. They are unstructured groups of followers of certain clerics. Thus 
many predict that the internal feuds among them will result in more fragmentation within 
Salafi parties (Brown, 2013; Al-Anani & Malik, 2013). The case of Al-Watan party 
which split from Al-Nour is a recent example. Unlike the Brotherhood, Salafis are not 
that familiar with long-term gradual change, they lack a clear setting of priorities and 
decision on compromise (Brown, 2013). 
 Before the revolution Salafis were not interested in politics. Some of their clerics 
prohibited participation in politics under a ―secular‖ regime that is based on man-law not 
God law. Others prohibited opposition to - and of course revolution against - the ruler as 
long as he is namely a Muslim (Brown, 2013; Al-Anani & Malik, 2013). Salafi also said 
they refrained from political participation due to repression under Mubarak regime. 
Although some Salafi leaders were hesitant in joining the revolution, but many Salafi 
youth were among the demonstrators in Tahrir square (Bohn, 2011). 
 After the revolution, the Salafis quickly gained electoral success. They first 
participated in the political process in March 2011, when they supported the 
constitutional amendments which they saw as a way to protect the second article in the 
Egyptian constitution which states Islamic law principles are the main source of 
legislation (Brown, 2013). They later on formed three political parties, Al-Nour, Al-Asala 
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and Al-Fadila. Lately a group of Salafis left Al-Nour to Establish Al-Watan party. Before 
the Parliamentary elections, Al-Nour and Al-Asala joined the Democratic Alliance, an 
electoral coalition led by the Muslim Brotherhood, but they later left the coalition after 
disagreements with the Brotherhood on the distribution of list-seats. They later on formed 
the Islamic Coalition with Al-Banaa w Al-Tanmiya party of Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamyya. The 
coalition won 127 seats in the People‘s Assembly, of them 111 went to Al-Nour (Lacroix, 
2012). 
 Attempts to explain Salafis popularity indicated three factors. First, the Salafi 
satellite channels which began in 2006 and included around 10 Salafi channels (Field & 
Hamam, 2009). Before the revolution, most of these channels focused on religious 
preaching. Afterwards they began discussing politics and introduced daily talk-shows. 
Second, Salafi charitable organizations like Al-Game‘yya Al-Shari‘yya (Sharia-Based 
Society) and Ansar Al-Sunna Al-Muhammadeyya (Advocates of the Prophet 
Muhammad‘s Path and Teachings) have a nation-wide network with around 5000 and 
200 local branches respectively. Both provide educational and medical assistance along 
with religious preaching. Although both organizations are apolitical, Al-Noor party 
depended on their local branches to select candidates that ran on his lists in the 
parliamentary elections (Tadros, 2012).  
 Despite what they share, Salafi parties differ in many positions. Al-Nour is 
considered the most pragmatic among them (Al-Anani & Malik, 2013). Al-Nour 
supported Abdelmoniem Abu ElFotouh, the former brotherhood member, in the first 
round of the presidential elections, then President Morsi in the second round, while most 
of the Salafi groups supported President Morsi from the beginning especially after the 
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disqualification of Hazem Salah Abu Ismail (Brown, 2013).. A rift between Al-Nour and 
the Brotherhood began in February 2012 when Al-Nour leader who worked as an Advisor 
to the President on Environmental Affairs was dismissed from his position (Al-
Dakhakhny, 2013). Al-Nour gradually moved to opposition seats since then.  
 Egyptian Press 
 The relationship between the press and the government in Egypt was always 
ambivalent: ranging from press freedom to strict government control (Khamis, 2011) 
Under the Ottoman rule and the British occupation, Egypt had a vibrant, diverse, strong 
print media (Khamis, 2011). After 1952 revolution, Abdel-Nasser nationalized the press, 
limiting its diversity and competency. Sadat came afterwards and allowed some party 
newspapers.  Mubarak introduced some media privatization, but it was not until after 
January 25
th
 revolution that Egyptian media changed dramatically (Khamis, 2011). 
 Before the revolution, Mubarak regime used a variety of tools to maintain control 
over the political expression in the media (Elmasry 2012). Although the Egyptian 
constitution in his era provided the basics for press freedom, legislations opened the door 
for severe constraints (ANHRI, 2008). The 1996 press law and its 2006 amendments 
maintained journalists imprisonment in several occasions and dozens of them received 
prison sentences for violating it (Elmasry, 2011). It also preserved government control 
over press licensing with unlimited authorities to revoke permits (ANHRI, 2008). In 
Mubarak thirty years of rule, Egypt lived under a state of emergency. The emergency law 
was used occasionally to ban publications and arrest journalists (Elmasry, 2011).  
 Egyptian journalists also suffered from abuse, harassment, and intimidation. 
Many obstacles stood in the way of gathering verified information due to government 
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monopoly over information sources and suspicion towards party and private newspapers 
(Elmasry, 2011). Some subjects were beyond coverage like the President and his family, 
armed forces and security bodies, besides cultural taboos (Elmasry, 2011). Journalists 
practiced self-censorships to avoid legal punishment and to please the owners and 
advertisers of their publications (Cooper, 2008; Peterson, 2011).  
 Three forms of newspaper ownership existed: State-owned newspapers, party 
newspapers, and private newspapers. Opposition parties‘ organs were not popular papers. 
They received government subsidies (Elmasry, 2011; Khamis 2011). It was not until 2004 
that Al-Masry Al-Youm a private daily was licensed in Egypt after approximately 50 
years of absence of private press (Cooper, 2008).  But private media publishers had to 
have clearance from security bodies in order to be granted a license (Peterson, 2011). 
Thus ownership remained in the hands of Mubarak-friendly business men. However, the 
introduction of private media - both print and broadcast - along with the advancement and 
spread of information technology including satellite, internet, social media and mobile 
media lightened government control over the media and enabled the press to began 
crossing some red lines (Khamis, 2011; Iskandar, 2012). 
 Under Mubarak, disparities between the state-run and private newspapers reached 
a level as if they were talking about different realities. In Cooper study (2008) Al-Masry 
Al-Youm focused mainly on domestic politics, corruption and human rights news, and 
relied less on official sources than Al-Ahram. However, President news were given the 
first priority in both newspapers as part of ―the one-man show‖ that characterized 
Egyptian media from 1952 to 2011 (Khamis, 2011; Peterson, 2011). 
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 Elmasry (2011) classified the Egyptian press system under Mubarak as a 
‗polarized pluralistic‘ press model characterized by medium state intervention through 
ownership and legislations, mixed types of ownership, low professional standards and 
low corporatization (referring to the commercialization of the press), in addition to a 
pseudo-Islamic cultural orientation (Elmasry, 2011). Khamis (2011) added neglect of 
grassroots media and top-to-bottom media policy.  
 The media landscape after the January 25
th
 revolution looked like how it was 
before 1952 revolution in terms of the variety and the dynamism of the media scene. 
Private media flourished with the launch of more than a dozen private satellite channels. 
More Egyptian dailies were published either by parties or private companies. Egypt 
ranking on press freedom indexes improved (Freedom House, 2013). But the transitional 
period was marred with some hallmarks.   
 State media suffered from a ‗credibility crisis‘ because the discrepancy between 
the way they covered the revolution and how events were reported on transitional 
satellites and online media. This lack of credibility was the main reason for the 
abolishment of the Ministry of Information in the new constitution (Khamis, 2011). 
 Under SCAF and despite their early promise to abolish the Ministry of 
Information right after the revolution, the ministry was revived and later on a General 
was appointed as the Minister (Nasser, 2013). The SCAF also appointed new heads to the 
state-owned newspapers, but this did not change the way they used to work before the 
revolution (Peterson, 2011).  Many in the state media complained from ongoing 
restrictions in editorial policies (Walker & Orttung, 2012). In some extreme cases, at least 
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five state TV or radio presenters were taken off air or faced prosecution for being critical 
of the military (Walker & Orttung, 2012). 
 There was also chaos in private media. Journalists and presenters who were anti-
revolution were reintroduced (Nasser, 2013; Walker & Orttung, 2012). Self-censorship 
was still practiced. The editor of El-Masry Al-Youm prevented the second issue of its 
English edition from publishing for what he deemed unacceptable criticism of the SCAF 
(Freedom House, 2013).  
 Furthermore, SCAF directly warned journalists from publishing news critical to 
the military (Freedom House, 2011). Many activists and journalists who criticized the 
military were trialed before military courts (Reporters without Borders - RSF, 2011).  A 
blogger was sentenced to three years in prison for insulting the military (Khamis, 2011). 
In addition, fifteen cases of attacks and detention of journalists were documented by the 
end of 2011 (Freedom House, 2013). Despite this, media criticism of SCAF and the 
government increased (Hamdy, 2013). 
 Social media, on the other hand, expanded its role in post-revolution Egypt. Many 
state institutions and public figures used social media as their primary mean to reach the 
public providing another source of information albeit easily and frequently falsified 
(Peterson, 2011; Khamis, 2011). 
 Under President Morsi, lawsuits against journalists reached their highest level. 
But the President banned pre-trial detention of journalists in media offences, just after a 
court ordered the pre-detention of the editor of daily Al-Dostor on charges of publishing 
false information and insulting the president (RSF, 2012). The editor was released on the 
same day of the president‘s decision. A second print of one of Al-Dostor issues was 
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confiscated by a court rule in August 2012 following lawsuits accusing it of inciting 
sectarian strife (Ali, 2012). Also the controversial TV channel Al-Faraeen owned by 
Tawfik Okasha was suspended for 45 days after being accused of defaming and inciting 
to kill the president (Egypt Independent, 2012b). The presidency later withdrew all its 
legal complaints against journalists whom it accused of defamation (CPJ, 2013; Amin, 
2013). But there were other complaints filed by citizens accusing journalists of insulting 
the president (Ahram Online, 2013). Lawsuits against journalists also came from judges 
who filed 1,164 complaints accusing journalists and TV hosts of insulting judiciary 
(Doss, 2012). In addition, a journalist was shot in the head, (possibly by a sniper), while 
covering the presidential palace clashes in December 2012, and the attack went 
unpunished (Berger, 2013). Several others, including two from the FJP newspaper, were 
wounded in Al-Mokattam clashes in March, 2013 (Taha, 2013).  
 The Shura Council, the owner of state newspapers according to the law at that 
time, changed the leadership of state-owned newspapers. President Morsi appointed a 
new information minister from the Brotherhood. Despite reported complaints from 
interference in editorial policies, and the ‗Brotherhoodization‘ of the media (Khairy, 
2012), which allegedly caused two state-TV presenters to object on air (Amin 2013), 
there has been reports that state media changed to an extent from acting as the mouth 
piece of the ruling party (Kirkpatrick & El-Sheikh, 2012) which was interpreted as a 
failure of the Brotherhood control the state media as their predecessors did (AP, July 12, 
2013).   
 The Egyptian constitution of 2012 abolished many of the previous constraints on 
the freedom of the press (The Egyptian constitution, 2012), but it was criticized for 
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lacking practical mechanisms to carry its stated principle and of ―vaguely-worded 
provisions‖ (Doss, 2012; RSF, 2013).  The constitution guaranteed the freedom of 
information and the right to access public information. It banned state censorship on 
media except in a limited form in times of war. It prohibited the closure or confiscation of 
media outlets except with a court order. Newspapers are no longer licensed via permits 
but established through notification. The constitution also created two independent 
regulatory bodies, one to supervise state-owned media and the other for the regulation of 
private media, however it did not state the composition of the two bodies (Doss, 2012).  
 Some prominent private media took anti-Morsi and Brotherhood positions (Al-
Majid, 2012; Esposito, 2013; Elmasry, 2013; Amin, 2013; Howaidy, 2013a; El-Amin, 
2013; Margolis, 2013), while others remained neutral in their coverage. According to the 
Index on Censorship, ―most‖ private media ―routinely [vilified] President Mohamed 
Morsi and his ruling Muslim Brotherhood‖ while glorifying the army as the ―guardians of 
the revolution‖ (Amin, 2013). 
 The Egyptian Journalists Syndicate, which was once the main fighter for press 
freedom under Mubarak, became a place for political battles after the revolution (Berger, 
2013). Egyptian press is badly affected by the lack of self-regulation and the absence of 
effective professional ethics (El-Nawawy, 2013).  
 Although some journalists and media experts believe that Egyptian media were 
greatly constrained under Morsi (see Abdulla, 2013), but studies on newspapers content 
revealed that many previous red lines on press coverage no longer existed (Rayman, 
2013). 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Framing Muslims 
 Despite the post-September 11 surge in media studies examining coverage of 
Islam and Muslims, very few studies have gone deeper to analyze media representations 
of Islamists. Most of the studies examining Islam and Muslims reveal that Orientalist 
discourse and ‗clash of civilizations‘ (Huntington, 1993) assumptions prevail, where 
Muslims are framed as violent, anti-modern, untrustworthy ‗Others‘ (Mahony, 2010, 
Ibrahim, 2010; Meer, Dwyer, & Modood, 2010; Powell, 2011; Kabir & Bourk, 2012; 
Shaw, 2012; Halse, 2012, Rane & Hersi, 2012). The few studies that analyzed the 
representation of Islamists in media and cultural products found strong similarities 
between how media in Muslim countries framed Islamists and Western media 
representations of Muslims (Armbrust, 2002; Allagui & Najjar, 2011; Khatib, 2006) 
including frames used (or silenced), reasons given, and solutions offered; which suggests 
a similar potential effect on policy, public attitudes, and Islamists themselves.  
Dominant themes in media coverage of Islam and Muslims since September 11 
have been terrorism and violence, with media reports referring to Muslims as dangerous 
potential terrorists and Islam as a security threat (Mahony, 2010; Shaw, 2012; Rane & 
Hersi, 2012). Research found that Islam was portrayed as ‗inherently violent‘ and 
Muslims as violence-oriented (Kumar, 2010, p. 254). Studies have also found that Islam 
and Muslims have been closely associated with terrorism news in general (Powell, 2011; 
Kabir & Bourk, 2012). Powell (2011) developed a model for US media coverage of 
terrorist events where frames differed depending on the religion of the terrorist. If he is a 
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Muslim, he is linked with international terrorism, identified as part of the ‗War of Islam 
on America‘ (Powel, 2011, p. 105), and fear of possible future attacks is emphasized. If 
he is a non-Muslim US citizen, he is humanized by searching for excuses and 
investigating the context, while downgrading possible future attacks of the same kind. 
Halse (2012) found similarities between US news media representation of terrorists and 
the representation of Muslims in the television serial 24. The serial depicted the 
stereotype of the ‗barbaric‘ Muslim: A militant aggressive fundamental Muslim who shall 
be rewarded heaven for killing (Halse, 2012, p. 10). Moreover, all Muslim characters in 
the TV serial were violent. 
 In terrorism/violence frames, the acts of a small minority of extremists are taken 
as representative of all Muslims, to assert that there is not but one kind of Muslim – a 
terrorist (Rane and Hersi, 2012; Kumar, 2010). Media have ignored the diversity among 
Muslims and presented extreme religious interpretations of Islam as if they were Islam 
itself. 
 A prevailing theme in media coverage of Islam and Muslims was the portrayal of 
Muslims, as anti-modern and undemocratic. Research on Australian press found that the 
integration of Muslims in society is measured with cultural indicators: specifically their 
adherence to Western ―democratic‖ values and freedoms, and use of English language, 
not by political, economic, social indicators (Rane and Hersi, 2012). In the television 
serial 24, Muslims were considered to be deceivingly modern if they adopted modern 
outlook and lifestyle, but with the same ―Islamic‖ mindset (Halse, 2012).  
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 Sexism and victimization of Muslim women were also prominent in portrayals of 
Muslims in the press (Rane & Heris, 2012). Islam was represented as a religion where 
Muslim women are victims of God and man‘s oppression (Kumar, 2010). 
Diversity and change in framing Muslims 
 Most studies found little or no counter frames in media representation of Islam 
and Muslims whether in news or entertainment. When frames are not challenged, their 
perceived dominance increases and they become ‗taken-for-granted‘ (Kumar, 2010). 
Framing was mostly negative but some studies highlighted progress towards positive 
framing. Rane and Hersi (2012) found some positive representation of Muslims in the 
Australian press within the frame of multiculturalism. Mahony (2010) found ‗a small 
minority‘ of Australian news articles to achieve balance through providing contextual 
background that challenged stereotypical presentation (p. 754). Narayana and Kapur 
(2011) revealed that despite the prevailing stereotypical framing of Muslims in Indian 
English newspapers, news slanting was more favorable than unfavorable following 
Gujarat riots in which Muslims were killed.  
 In some cases, however, news media did portray differences among Muslim 
communities, although this was limited to local Muslims and tended to ―[highlight] 
opposing ends of a liberal/progressive versus conservative/traditional axis‖ to provide the 
―point/counter point views‖ (Sharify-Funk, 2009, p. 73). By doing this, Canadian 
newspapers helped in developing the debate within the Muslim community, but at the 
same time it increased polarization among Muslims (Sharify-Funk, 2009). The British 
press moved forward from this dichotomy to realize the diversity among Muslims. Meer, 
Dwyer, and Modood (2010) found that a year after the London attacks there was progress 
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in the coverage of Muslims from the racial stereotypes indicated by previous studies. 
Through recognizing that there are many Muslim voices, the British press overcame the 
fundamentalist-moderate dichotomy to a variety of ―angry‖, ―ambivalent,‖ and 
―approving‖ voices in the Muslim community (Meer, Dwyer, & Modood, 2010, p. 229). 
 A certain frame is also not fixed, it develops. Halse found a slight change in the 
anti-modern stereotype in his study on the television serial 24 to what he called ‗re-
localization of stereotypes‘ (Halse, 2012, p. 16). He referred to a new tendency to depict 
Muslims as modern in their outlook and lifestyle, but still traditional and extremist in 
their minds. In other words, Muslims behave as ordinary Americans outside, but still 
think as terrorists. 
 Representation and frames change for many reasons. First, framing change with 
events; frames were mostly negative in Australian press after attacks by Muslims (Rane 
& Hersi, 2012) while in the Indian English press they were positive only right after 
attacks against Muslims (Narayana & Kapur, 2012). Second, framing might differ across 
different types of newspapers coverage. Kabir and Bourk (2012) found differences 
between hard news and editorials in New Zealand newspapers‘ coverage of Islam; 
editorials were more likely to offer alternative frames within the liberal pluralistic point 
of view that counter negative stereotypes.  Shaw (2012) found the opposite in the British 
press: right-wing hardliners discourse prevailed. 
 Third, frames were also found to change when covering domestic and outside 
Islam; some studies found that terrorism was mainly asserted in covering external Islam 
but it was not necessarily the same with internal Muslim, others found the opposite. 
Analyzing US networks news right after 9/11, Ibrahim (2010) found that framing of 
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Muslims differed depending on whether they were US citizens or not. She found that a 
peace frame prevailed in relation to American Muslims, while violence and threat were 
emphasized only in covering Muslims outside the US.  Kabir and Bourk (2012) found 
that Islam and Muslims were mostly covered in international news related to terrorism in 
New Zealand newspapers, while local Muslims received insignificant coverage. In these 
studies, violent Islamists were depicted as external aliens. However, the opposite was also 
found. In the Australian press, Rane and Hersi (2012) found that after the London 
Bombings in 2005 ―the dominant frame… shift[ed] from international jihadists towards 
the threat posed by home-grown Muslims not integrating into society‘ (p.143). The same 
was reported as a change in the stereotypical terrorist in Halse‘s analysis of 24. There, it 
was emphasized that the Muslim enemy is now among us and can be next door (Halse, 
2012).  
 Fourth and most importantly, frames change with political discourse (Ibrahim, 
2010; Powell, 2011; Rane & Hersi, 2012). Studies found that the prevailing frames in US 
news media right after 9/11 attacks was positive and inclusive when covering American 
Muslims. This was a result of the discourse of White House right after the attacks which 
asserted that Islam is the religion of peace, and that the war on terror was not a war on 
Islam. But with external Islam the media adopted the government discourse of ‗us‘ vs. 
‗them‘. Moreover, political discourse was found to be the reason behind the prominence 
of issues related to Muslims in the Australian press (Rane & Hersi, 2012). This should 
not come as a surprise, media adoption of government discourse is due to its dependence 
on public officials as their primary sources (Powell, 2011). This also made framing 
global. Kabir and Bourk (2012) found in their study of New Zealand newspapers that as 
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local media relied on international news agencies in covering international news 
concerning Islam and Muslims, thus dominant frames were locally adopted. 
Reasons and consequences of Muslims framing  
 The common explanation behind the stereotypical representation of Muslims in 
the media is the Orientalist discourse and the clash of civilization theory (Mahony, 2010, 
Ibrahim, 2010; Meer, Dwyer, & Modood, 2010; Shaw, 2012; Kabir & Bourk, 2012). 
Powell (2011) concluded that US news media after 9/11 emphasized the oriental 
discourse of ‗us‘ vs. ‗them‘; evil Muslim/Arab/Islam vs. Good Christian America. 
Stereotypical representations in television serial 24 compared ‗the Orient (irrational, 
undeveloped, inferior) [to].. the West (rational, developed, superior)‘ (Halse, 2012, p. 
14). Moreover, overwhelming ‗pejorative‘ framing was not questioned nor challenged; 
whenever Muslims were the subject of news, the focus was solely on their religion and it 
was the determinant of their ‗Otherness‘ (Rane & Hersi, 2012, p. 144).  
 Five frames were detected in Kumar analysis of speeches and comments of the 
western ‗primary definers of news‘: those whom their framing of the problem ‗sets the 
limit for all subsequent discussions‘ (Hall et al., 1978) from Bush Jr. to Pope Benedict 
XVI.  These frames were ‗taken-for-granted‘ and presented as ‗common sense‘. First, 
Islam is ‗monolithic religion‘ where diversity in understanding Islam was ignored and 
Islam was presented as a static and rigid religion. Second, Islam is a violent religion, 
where acts of few violent Muslims were considered representative of Islam itself as a 
religion, and thus led to the assumption that each Muslim has a tendency towards being 
violent. Third, Islam is a sexist religion, where the veil was viewed as a tool for the 
oppression of Muslim women, who are victims that need to be rescued. Fourth, Muslims 
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are irrational people incapable of scientific thinking or reasoning. Fifth, Islam is the 
source of terrorism while the West is the source of democracy. Here, Islam is seen as 
despotic religion which needs the intervention of the West to be modernized and 
democratized.  
 Competing frames were absent in the political discourse. For example, a 
contextual frame could have investigated the reasons that led some Muslims to be 
terrorists, or a self-choice framing of the veil as a personal freedom. Overall, the absence 
of a framing contest led to a resurgence of the Oriental discourse and its current avatar 
the clash of civilizations which ‗became a central framing mechanism under the Bush 
administration‘ (Kumar, 2010, p. 255) and it is still influential even after Bush era.  
 Although few studies actually examined the effects of media Orientalist framing 
of Muslims, Islamophobia was regarded as the major consequence (Kumar, 2010, Powell; 
2011). Shaw (2012) found that when right-wing hardliners anti-Islam discourse prevailed 
in the British press, discriminating against Muslims and marginalizing Islam, more 
hostility and fear of Muslims was reported in media and reflected in government actions. 
Powell (2011) found US media framing to increase public support for foreign policy 
attacking Muslim countries. Another consequence would be increasing Muslim‘s feeling 
of exclusion and also public perception of Muslims ―otherness‖ as found in the Australian 
context (Rane & Hersi, 2012). A Pew poll in 2006 found that non-Muslims in Western 
countries believed that there is a ―conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a 
modern society‖. However, some studies found that negative attitudes towards Islam 
were not a direct result of media influence such as Brockett and Baird (2008) on British 
media.  
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Framing Islamists 
 Few studies were found to focus on media representation of Islamists in Muslim 
countries, and even fewer were conducted on Western countries. This may be due to the 
fact that Western media has often dealt with Islam as a singular monolithic religion 
without variations (Said, 1997). Although Mahony (2010) who compared framing of 
Islamists between Australian and Indonesian newspapers, cautioned against comparison 
between a Western and a Muslim context in covering Islamic movements because of the 
difference in culture and knowledge of the topic, other studies detected similarities 
between Western media representations of Muslims and non-Western media portrayals of 
Islamists. Moreover, Egyptian cinema was found to align with the stereotypical 
representations that reflect an Orientalist approach, but this time from Muslims towards 
Islamic movements (Armbrust, 2002; Allagui & Najjar, 2011; Khatib, 2006). 
 In Western contexts, the prevailing themes in covering Islamic groups were that 
‗political Islam‘ is incompatible with democracy, and, again, terrorism is a key 
component of Islamist ideology and practice. This was apparent in US and Australian 
press (Mishra, 2008; Mahony, 2010). US prestige newspapers coverage of political Islam 
in Turkey, Iran and Iraq implied the conflict between Islam and democracy. As Mishra 
indicated ‗any politically assertive role for Islam, violent or peaceful… [was framed] as a 
threat to Western civilization and democracy‘ (p. 171). In this view, Muslim countries 
that witnessed popularity of Islamic parties were portrayed as might-be another Iran. 
When covering Iran, US newspapers usually highlighted the Islamic nature of the regime, 
and attached this to its unpopularity among youth. Moreover, US newspapers implied an 
association between political Islam and lack of commitment to human rights and abuse of 
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women rights. Furthermore, any public role for religion was portrayed as irrational. As a 
result, US media emphasized that Islam should be reformed to move from ―Islamism to 
secularism, from tradition to Western modernity, from anti-Western to pro-Western 
attitudes‖ (p.173), and only that secularized and Westernized modern version of Islam 
can be compatible with democracy.  
 Very little counter frames were provided by Western media in their coverage of 
political Islam (Mishra, 2008; Mahony; 2010). They did not provide the view point of 
those who believe of a role of Islam in politics, or even come close to non western 
frames. They also provided no counter discourses that challenge the Orientalist 
assumptions, such as how the religious can be modern and democratic at the same time. 
When competing frames existed, they were the few in commentary, not in the news as in 
the case of US press (Mishra, 2008).   
 In Muslim countries, the main difference in newspapers framing was the 
differentiation between Islam and Islamic groups, but distinction between violent and 
nonviolent Islamists was not clear in all cases. Khan and Govindasamy (2011) found in 
their analysis of editorials in Bangladesh newspapers that all papers represented Islam as 
a religion of peace, but they tried to keep a distance with political Islam by emphasizing 
the secular nature of the struggle for independence and the secular identity of the 
constitution. Militant Muslims were excluded from the rest of society by insisting on the 
outside roots of the phenomenon (Khan & Govindasamy, 2011). Mohany (2010) found 
similar results when he compared Indonesian newspapers coverage of Islamic groups in 
the weeks after terrorist attacks to their Australian counterparts. Indonesian media was 
more balanced and representative of the Muslim community, at the same time it 
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cooperated with the government and Islamic groups to portray terrorism and violence as 
alien to Indonesian Islamic culture. 
Framing Islamists in the Egyptian Media 
 Very few studies were found on Egyptian press coverage of Islamists. One of 
these studies addressed the differences in covering Islamic movements between the 
Egyptian state-owned Al-Ahram newspaper and the International Herald Tribune 
(Dahmash, 2008). The study found that Al-Ahram allocated minimum space to covering 
the Muslim Brotherhood and most of the coverage focused on the group practices in 2005 
elections ―as if the group suddenly appeared during the elections‖ (Dahmash, 2008). Al-
Ahram coverage of the Brotherhood was found to be unbalanced, since it focused solely 
on what it perceived as mistakes and contradictions in the Brotherhood ideology and 
actions. In addition, Al-Ahram accused the Brotherhood of using violence and associated 
the group with violent Islamic movements.  It also claimed that the group conspired with 
the British occupation on Egypt at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Dahmash 
(2008) also found that Al-Ahram did not provide any view point supporting or even 
neutral to the Muslim Brotherhood in its coverage.  Thus, the Brotherhood was mainly 
introduced as ―the antagonist‖ in Al-Ahram coverage (Dahmash, 2008). On the contrary, 
the International Herald Tribune was found to be more neutral to the Muslim 
Brotherhood representing it as an opposition group that suffered oppression with other 
opposition forces under the authoritarian Arab regimes (Dahmash, 2008) 
 Most of the research on Islamic movements in the Egyptian media addressed the 
representation of Islamists in Egyptian movies. The few variations that existed in the 
news media of Muslim countries did not find its way to the cinema in Egypt, one of the 
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largest Muslim countries. This can be attributed to difference between news media and 
cultural products. Movie frames may be more extreme than news frames due to the fact 
the first is predominantly fictional while the other should be factual. However, an 
examination of representation of Islamic groups in Egyptian movies in the 1990s and the 
beginning of 21
st
 century leads to the conclusion that Islamic groups were portrayed 
similarly to Muslims in Western media, through an Orientalist lens (Armbrust 2002; 
Allagui & Najjar, 2011; Khatib, 2006).  . But some specifics were added, and more 
frames (though not very diverse) existed. 
 Egyptian cinema representation of Islamic groups employed the frames of 
terrorism/violence, anti-modernity, women victimization, and incompatibility with 
democracy. The terrorism frame dominated the presentation of Islamic groups in 
Egyptian movies (Allagui & Najjar, 2011; Khatib, 2006). They were presented as being 
necessarily violent and any association with them as an association with terrorism. The 
main behavior associated with Islamic groups in Egyptian cinema was violence 
(Armbrust, 2002) whether as a result of revenge or as a method of social reform. 
Violence actions depicted included killing Christians, tourists, and policemen, destruction 
of video stores, musical instruments and cafes, threatening people for different reasons, 
and verbal violence through angry manifestos and slogans.     
 Islamists were also shown in Egyptian cinema as anti-modern and medieval in 
their lifestyle and thinking, in comparison with progressive Egyptians (Khatib, 2006).  
Armbrust (2002) found that Egyptian movies created a discrepancy between Islamism 
which was associated with darkness and ignorance, and enlightenment which was 
associated with materialism and science. But in recent films the representation was 
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contradictory; Islamists were shown as ‗mystical, primitive, simple-minded and yet the 
most worldly and accomplished liar and manipulator‘ (Bhabha, 1983, p. 34).  
 Moreover, Egyptian movies were found to contrast between two stereotypes of 
women in framing Islamic groups. First, some women were framed as being oppressed by 
men‘s authority, with the veil serving as a manifestation of her oppression. Second, films 
also featured a ‗modern woman‘ who says no to Islamists (Allagui, & Najjar, 2011, p. 
218). In both cases, sexual repression was also presented as part of Islamists‘ disturbed 
personalities.  
 Furthermore, Egyptian movies reproduced the Egyptian government discourse on 
Islamic group as a threat to democracy (Khatib, 2006), emphasizing that an Islamic state 
can never be democratic. Some movies promoted the conspiracy frame by attributing 
Islamism to outside roots and depicting it as a conspiracy with a hidden agenda and 
unknown external sources of finance (Allagui & Najjar, 2011). Islamists were also 
viewed as a threat to national unity (Khatib, 2006) and the source of sectarian violence 
targeting Christians in Egypt (Allagui & Najjar, 2011). 
 Egyptian cinema offered some frames that did not exist in Western media. The 
movies provided different reasons for affiliation with Islamic groups (Armbrust, 2002; 
Khatib, 2006; Allagui & Najjar, 2011): (1) poverty and its associations including 
unemployment, and ignorance, (2) Frustration or psychological distress as a result of 
poverty or of isolation and marginalization by the government and richer classes, (3) 
immigration, especially to Gulf countries which attributed Islamism to outside roots, and 
(4) corruption and ineffective governance. In the latter, Islamists were shown to flourish 
in slum areas which suffered from poverty, marginalization and consequential aggression 
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and violence whether by authority or by society. They were also shown to be capable of 
recruit only vulnerable people from the lower classes, and sometimes even through failed 
state institutions. The reasoning for joining Islamic groups as provided by Islamists in the 
movies was religious ideology, and social reform/morality, however, the dominating 
theme was that no one became Islamist by self-choice, but due to the context. Revenge 
was the main reason for affiliation provided by other parties in the movies including the 
government and society; Islamists were framed as victims of the torture and humiliation 
committed by authorities that provoked them seek revenge. 
 Egyptian movies also represented Islamic groups as interest-driven not ideology-
based. Unlike Western framing which attributed Islamists behavior to their Islamic 
ideology, Islamists were depicted in Egyptian cinema as corrupt and hypocritical, not 
because of their ideology, but because they diverged from Islam (Khatib, 2006). Thus, 
using violence or seeking public office was for personal gains like revenge and wealth. 
 Egyptian movies introduced two alternatives in dealing with Islamic groups 
(Allagui & Najjar, 2011). The first solution was violence and coercion by authorities, 
which led to the conclusion that death is the result of joining Islamists. In many cases this 
was shown as the primary reason for Islamists‘ violence. The other alternative was 
offered by society where there are two possible positions; either denial and social 
isolation, or collaboration with authorities in their fight with Islamists. A third way of 
rehabilitation was less depicted in movies. 
 Two recent films offered some counter framing. Unlike traditional government 
supported films, these films provided more contextual evidence and different explanation 
for Islamism popularity, including state in-effectiveness, the world order, and Israeli 
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occupation of Palestine (Allagui, & Najjar, 2011). One movie come out of the traditional 
treatment that depicts Islamists as ‗uncivilized bigots and potential terrorists who practice 
a primitive or violent religion‘ (Karim, 2003, p. 96), it instead show them as modern 
people whether in dress, language or behavior.  
 Some studies suggested absent frames that emerge from the real analysis of the 
Islamists phenomena. Armbrust (2002) suggested representing some Islamists as 
embracing modernity; they are educated people working in different professions, and as a 
result of ‗political blockage‘. Allagui, & Najjar (2011) proposed frames that focus on the 
developmental role Islamists play in poor areas resembled in institutions like mosques, 
schools, cliniques, and banks which not only compensate for state ineffectiveness, but 
also provide power for Islamic groups. 
 Just like their Western counterparts, Egyptian cinema reproduced government 
discourse on Islamists. The dominance of themes like Islamists as a threat to democracy 
and national unity was only a repetition of government discourse (Khatib, 2006). Some 
films like ‗the Terrorist‘ were even considered to be promoted and encouraged by the 
Egyptian government in its fight against terrorism to prevent the audience from 
sympathizing with Islamists and to provide public support for government actions  
(Allagui & Najjar, 2011).  
 Despite being represented mostly in Egyptian cinema as a home-grown 
phenomenon, Islamic groups were framed as the ‗Other‘, according to the Orientalist 
discourse, in Egyptian movies (Allagui & Najjar, 2011).  By doing so, Egyptian cinema 
was ‗colonial‘; relying on ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ presentation, where Islamists are framed as 
‗alien and inferior‘ to the society, ‗lacking ‗our‘ morals and being essentially different 
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from ‗us‘ (Khatib, 2006, p.76).  This aligns with western representation of the same 
phenomena, far from its reality, though for different nationalistic reasons (Armbrust, 
2002; Khatib, 2006). In both cases, the Orientalist discourse was used as a tool to either 
provoke fear of or exert control on that ‗Other‘ (Mishra, 2008). In this sense: 
‗…both East and West do not seem to be divided that much after all. 
Thus, the East tries to exclude a part of itself as an 'Other', while the 
West excludes it‘ (Khatib, 2006, p.77). 
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III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: FRAMING THEORY 
 Although framing studies have been very popular in recent years, there is still 
some ambiguity in the definition of framing (Scheufele, 1999; Borah, 2011), partly due to 
the comprehensive nature of most of its definitions (Weaver, 2007). But the underlying 
assumption remains the same. Any issue or event can be viewed from multiple 
perspectives, and can be presented as related to multiple beliefs, values or considerations 
(Chong & Druckman, 2007). 
 According to Entman (1993) ―to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived 
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote 
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described‖ (p. 50). But frames don‘t necessarily include all 
four functions. Thus, de Vreese (2005) suggested that a frame is merely ―an emphasis in 
salience of different aspects of a topic‖ (p. 53).   
 Gamson and Modigliani (1989) defined a frame as ―a central organizing idea… 
for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue‖ (p. 3). Frames are the 
internal structures of what they call ―media packages‖ which are the sub- units of any 
media discourse. Media packages consisted of framing devices and reasoning devices. 
Framing devices are ―condensing symbols… [that suggest] how to think about the issue‖ 
such as metaphors, historical examples, catchphrases, depictions, and images. These are 
different from reasoning devices ―that justify what should be done about [the issue]‖ like 
arguments on causes, consequences and moral evaluations (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, 
p. 3).  
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 Some researchers, like Callaghan and Schnell (2001), proposed a very narrow 
definition of frames as explicit or implicit arguments. Thus, equating frames with 
arguments of different positions. But in Gamson and Modigliani view (1989) frames are 
not positions, a frame may include many positions that share its underlying assumptions, 
and every issue-frame can include both pro and against positions. In this sense a frame 
provides a context (Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman, Bliss, & Ghanem, 1991), which 
lends itself to more than one position.  
Framing and Agenda-setting 
 Framing is sometimes described as the second level of Agenda-setting.  Agenda-
setting as a theory of mass media focus on the perceived importance the media gives to 
different issues, and what effect this might have on public perception about the 
importance of these issues. The first level of agenda-setting analyzes the salience of 
issues in the media, whereas framing as a second level of agenda-setting focus on the 
salience of the issue attributes (de Vreese, 2005). But some researchers argued that this 
implies that issues or objects are more general than the attributes which is not always the 
case like in the ‗Cold War‘ frame (Weaver, 2007).  
 In Agenda-setting, framing as a second level is defined as ―the selection of a 
restricted number of thematically related attributes for inclusion on the media agenda 
when a particular object is discussed‖ (Weaver, 2007). 
Media Framing Process 
 Generally, framing is a process by which people build or change their 
understanding for issues (Chong & Druckman, 2007). In communication, Entman (1993) 
argued that frames exist in four location across the communication process; in the mind 
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of the communicator which influence his decisions, in the communicative text, in the 
receiver‘s mind which may or may not agree with the communicator‘s frame or the text 
frame, and finally in culture which is ―the stock of commonly invoked frames‖ (Entman, 
1993, p. 53).  
 As a process, framing could be divided to four phases: frame-building, frame-
setting, individual level consequences of framing, and societal level consequences of 
framing which also include a feedback from audience to media frames (Scheufele, 1999; 
de Vreese, 2005). Frame-building involves all the processes that influence how 
journalists create or change frames (Scheufele, 1999), like the interaction between 
journalists, elites and social movements. The frame - which is the outcome of this phase - 
is influenced by many factors that are internal and external to the media environment (de 
Vreese, 2005). Frame setting is the interaction between media frames and audience pre-
existing frames (de Vreese, 2005). The third stage includes all individual level effects of 
framing like changing attitudes and behavior (Scheufele, 1999). The fourth stage is the 
societal influences of framing on processes like ―political socialization, decision-making 
and collective action‖ (de Vreese, 2005, p. 52).  Scheufele (1999) added a feedback from 
audience to media frames because journalists are also audience members who are 
‗susceptible‘ to the same frames they often use.  
Frame Production 
 Many factors may affect the outcome of the frame-building process. Gamson and 
Modigliani (1989) identified three factors: culture, sponsors activities, and media 
practices. First, cultural resonance affects the appeal of frames among audience who 
share this culture. But it is important to note that the same culture can support both the 
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frames and the counter frames that may be provoked on an issue. In Gamson and 
Modigliani‘s (1989) study of US media framing of nuclear power, they found a 
‗progress‘ frame which favored technological advancement but also a counter frame that 
emphasized the desire to preserve nature from nuclear dangers, and both frames had their 
roots in the broad American culture. Second, sponsors activities, or, in Entman‘s (2007) 
words, the public relations skills of those who promote certain frames, like public 
officials, political parties and social movements, affect the outcome of the frame-building 
process. In these activities frames are adapted to journalism norms and values to be sold 
to journalists (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Although journalists may try to be objective 
as much as possible, still their reporting might reflect the dominant frame that inhibits 
audience from assessing the situation correctly. Journalists unconsciously often ―allow 
the most skillful media manipulators to impose their dominant frames on the news‖ 
(Entman, 1993, p. 57). The third factor is media practices which decisively affect the 
outcome of frame production process (Iyengar, 2005; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) often 
leading to framing bias. 
Framing Bias  
 Frames are not only products of journalists‘ perception of reality, but also of 
journalism market competition on audience (Stout & Buddenbaum, 2003) which demands 
certain media practices. In his study of framing social movements, Boykoff (2006) 
provided an explanation for unconscious framing bias that happens as a result of 
interrelated media norms. News frames are not a conspiracy against those who are framed 
negatively. But news values, that determine what news is and how to frame it, lend 
themselves to negative representation of social movements (Boykoff, 2006). Values like 
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novelty, drama, personalization, fragmentation (due to lack of contextual data), and 
authority-disorder (news media tendency to rely in times of crisis on official sources that 
assures everything will be good soon) all lead to shallow framing of social movement 
(Boykoff, 2006).  But several studies also found that journalists have a tendency to rely 
on the official narration of issues all the time, and even when this narration is challenged 
it is largely within the same underlying frame (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Entman 
(2010) highlights the tendency of the media to treat ―political process critically but policy 
substance passively‖ (p. 395). There is also the balance norm which is activated when 
journalists detect an established critique to a narration, in this case journalists tend to 
reduce the debate on an issue to the two different views of the ―legal‖ challengers, for 
example Republicans and Democrats in the US. Other minor or ‗illegal‘ challengers are 
excluded along with their frames (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).  In their study of the 
news framing of anti-nuclear movement in US, Entman and Rojecki (1993) found that 
media frames reproduced government narratives on the issue and officials reactions to the 
less-covered social movement despite the fact that the public opposed the government. 
 Entman (2007) proposed an overarching paradigm to integrate the concepts of 
framing, agenda-setting and priming in the study of news slanting and bias, and how 
these phenomena influence the distribution of power in democratic societies. He focused 
on two kinds of bias: content bias, and decision biases. Content bias occurs when news 
stories favor one side over the other/s. Decision biases stems from three different sources: 
Journalistic values or market competition, evaluation of the political game and 
ideological biases. News slanting or content bias is the result of interaction between 
perceived facts, media skills of each side in the conflict, the three different kinds of 
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decision biases, in addition to event‘s context and audience schema (Entman, 2007; 
2010).  A similar conclusion was reached by Aday (2010) in analyzing US network news 
coverage of Iraq and Afghanistan wars in 2005. He suggested that the ability of a 
president to preserve positive framing (which doesn‘t necessarily mean positive news) 
depends on a number of factors including events themselves, news media focus on these 
events and the degree of counter framing from opposition.  
Framing effects 
 The way media frames events and issues affects how audience perceive them, and 
consequently develop opinions, attitudes and behaviors towards them (Entman, 1993; 
Fornaciari, 2011; Chong & Druckman, 2007). Detection of frames in the media does not 
guarantee that they will influence audience, because any effect depends on the interaction 
between media frames and audience frames. Audience frames (which are also called 
schemata and/or stereotypes) can be defined as ―mentally stored clusters of ideas that 
guide individual processing of information‖ (Entman, 1993, p. 53).  
 In the study of framing effects on the individual level, researchers differentiate 
moderators from mediators. Moderating variables like individual values, knowledge and 
source credibility condition framing effects (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Mediating 
variables are psychological processes that mediate framing effects such as the 
availability, accessibility and applicability of frames on a certain issue.  
 Framing effects are based on many factors. In addition to individual beliefs and 
considerations, also the strength and emphasis on a frame, and the existence and the 
features of competing frames should be examined (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Entman 
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(1993) argued that in explaining framing effects, included and excluded frame are equally 
important.  
Framing, political power, and public opinion 
 Societal effects of framing include their effects on government policy, and public 
opinion. Frames define ―the boundaries of acceptable discourse‖ (Entman, 1993, p .55). 
Alternatives outside these boundaries are not likely to affect policy or enjoy public 
support. By defining what is normal, the mass media then excludes dissent movements as 
abnormal (Boycoff, 2006).  
 Another consequence is that once a frame is established, it is harder to challenge 
it.  Using another frame may lead to either a perception of lack of credibility or failure to 
understand in part of the audiences (Entman, 1993). In this sense, framing is a way to 
assess the division of power through communication texts; a news frame is ―the imprint 
of power – it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the 
text‖ (Entman, 1993, p. 55). Thus, media discourse is ―a place of ideological and 
ideational struggle for various social movements, state actors, and institutions‖ (Boykoff, 
2006, p. 227). 
 Moreover, when elites control the framing of public issues, they determine what 
the public opinion is (through polls and votes). This raise doubts on what truly constitute 
the public opinion if its manifestations can all be influenced by framing (Entman, 1993). 
What makes things worse is that journalists‘ perceptions about public opinion, even if 
inaccurate, also affect their framing of issues (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). 
 Slanted framing is common and though its effect might be minor on the larger 
population according to many studies, the small percentage that is affected can be of great 
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influence either for being political elites or being determinant in a political race like in the 
case of a close elections (Entman, 2010). 
 Entman and Rojecki (1993) in their study of newspapers framing of anti-nuclear 
movement from 1980-1983 found that negative media framing of the social movement 
inhibited its success despite the fact that the majority of Americans supported its 
argument. Negative framing discouraged ordinary people who support the movement but 
are not members in it from joining its activities, it also discourages the movement itself 
from demanding ‗a place on government agenda‘ and a government response to their 
policy proposals. This resulted in a symbolic rather than a concrete response from 
government to the movement‘s concerns. 
 On the other hand, Boykoff (2006) found that media frames force social 
movements to be more radical in order to get media attention that is based on news 
values. Social movements are incited by the media to create ‗pseudo-events‘ that are 
marked with exaggerated rhetoric and sometimes militancy in order to grab media 
attention (Boykoff, 2006). 
Research on Framing 
 In framing research, frames can be dependent or independent variables. They can 
also be inductive emerging from the text or deductive meaning that they are defined 
before examining the text (de Vreese, 2005). Identify a news frame, four conditions must 
be met (de Vreese, 2005). It must have recognized characteristics (linguistic or 
conceptual), it must be commonly used by journalists, it must be recognizable by others, 
and it should be distinguished from other frames. But studies also found that frames 
overlap and may exist within the same news story (Boykoff, 2006). So researchers tend to 
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identify the dominant frame by distinguishing core facts (that might be the same across 
different media) from elements that carrying a frame or ‗framing devices‘. De Vreese 
(2005) reviewed scholarly research and gathered many elements that could be examined 
as ‗framing devices‘. They included: language choice, metaphors, examples, catchy 
phrases, depictions and visual images. Also headlines, subheads, photos and their 
captions, leads, sources selected, quotes selected from sources, pull quotes, logos, 
statistics and charts, and concluding statements and paragraphs (de Vreese, 2005, p. 54). 
Types of Frames  
1. Media Frames and Audience Frames 
 Frames can be classified along many criteria. Researchers distinguish between 
audience or individual frames, and media frames (Scheufele, 1999), or ―frame in thought‖ 
and ―frame in communication.‖ The set of factors that affect an individual‘s judgment 
―constitute an individual‘s frame in thought,‖ whereas organization and interpretation of 
information presented by a speaker constitute the frame in communication (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007). Frames in communication can be produced by the media, government, 
politicians, activists, interest groups, social movements and in some cases members of the 
audience themselves.  
2. Analytical and Judgment frames 
 The content of the frame as well as its direction affect support for different 
policies (de Vreese, 2005). Some frames imply a value judgment of one direction, while 
others are analytical categories which can be of neutral, positive or negative judgments 
(Boykoff, 2006). Determining a frame direction is necessary to assess its effect. 
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3. Episodic and Thematic  
 Iyengar (2005) found on his study of the coverage of social issues in US news 
media that social issues were covered episodically as issues related to and limited to 
certain events, not thematically as issues with complex and continuously-developing 
context.  Boycoff (2006) also found the same in US media coverage of social movements. 
It is episodic rather than thematic. This leads to media failure to focus on ideas, context, 
and issues raised by social movements, and instead the light is shed on the events created 
by social movements and the participants in these events. Eventually this leads to 
shallow, misinformed and biased coverage which overall create a negative image that 
discourage participation in social movements.  
4.  Issue-specific frames and generic frames 
 Another classification of frames is Issue-specific and generic frames. A 
disadvantage of issue-specific frames is that they do not enable comparison across issues 
or generalization to a set of issues, they may also make researchers find what they are 
looking for. Generic frames on the other hand may reveal patterns in news coverage (de 
Vreese, 2005).   
 Some generic frames have been repeated across some studies in different contexts 
(Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Fornaciari, 2011), like the human impact or human face 
frame where the focus is on how individuals are affected by an issue or event 
emphasizing an emotional angle, the powerlessness frame depicting how weak 
individuals or groups are dominated by others, the economics or economic consequences 
frame emphasizing economic costs, gains or losses of an issue on individuals, groups, or 
countries, the morality frame which refers to sources of moral judgment like religion or 
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moral norms, the conflict frames which views an issue or an event as a contest between 
individuals, groups or countries with winners and losers, and the responsibility frame 
which attributes the responsibility of causing or solving an issue to an individual, 
government or group. Some frames were found to dominate in certain periods. Like the 
game frame in elections seasons, where the news media predict electoral success using 
competition vocabulary (de Vreese, 2005).  Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) found that 
the use of different news frames was related to media type and the topic covered. Serious 
media outlets relied more on responsibility and conflict frames, while the human interest 
frame appeared more in sensationalist media.   
 An example of issue-specific frames can be found in the literature on framing 
social movements. Entman and Rojecki (1993) revealed seven ‗evaluative dimensions‘ in 
news stories that might affect social movements ability to gain public and/or elite support 
because journalists take subjective decisions on these dimensions. They include 
rationality or emotionality of movement ideas, expertise of the movement that might 
enable it to propose valid policies, the amount of public support, unity among the 
movement on its goal, its level of extremism in comparison with the mainstream, and its 
power in influencing government decisions.  
 Boykoff (2006) analyzed US news media coverage of the global justice 
movement in 1999 and 2000. He revealed four main frames: the violence, disruption, 
freak, ignorance and amalgam of grievances frames. The violence frame focused on 
violent protestors or potential violent protestors. The disruption frame focused on either 
disruption of official work and meetings, or disruption of ordinary people‘s lives. The 
freak frame magnified the differences between protestors and the mainstream society and 
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considered the most radical members as a representation of the whole movement. Also in 
this frame the multilingual, multiethnic and multinational nature of the protestors was 
emphasized to prove their weirdness. In the ignorance frame protestors are presented as 
either ―ignorant or uninformed‖ (p. 218) and again this is generalized to the whole 
movement. The ―amalgam of grievances‖ frame represented protestors as fighting for too 
many causes. This neutral frame was presented negatively more than positively. News 
media also presented protestors as opposing natural phenomena like trade, while this was 
not the case. In Boycoff view (2006) it was like saying that protestors against genetically 
modified food are against food. Moreover, Boycoff found that television news relied 
more on frames of visual nature like violence and disruption, while newspapers relied 
more in frames that are built on details like freak, and ignorance frames. 
5. Inductive and deductive approaches to framing 
 Scholars used two approaches in framing research. The ‗deductive approach‘ 
defines a set of frames before examining the communication text, while the ‗inductive 
approach‘ let frames ‗emerge… during the course of analysis‘ from the communication 
text itself (de Vreese, 2005, p. 53). 
 Building on studies of media representation of Islam, Muslims and Islamists and 
on framing literature, this study used both the inductive and deductive approaches to 
framing. It ended up with a set of 11 frames. Some are generic and some are specific to 
the Egyptian context.  
 The ―anti-democracy‖ frame introduced Islamists as seeking only to consolidate 
their power, working for their own interests and against the people‘s good, excluding 
others, standing against basic freedoms and the rule of law, assaulting judiciary, 
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exercising dictatorship, repressing their opponents, and forcing a theological state. 
Attached with this frame was the ‗Brotherhoodization of the State‘ theme which, similar 
to Islamization in the Western media, viewed any appointment of an Islamist in state 
institutions as part of a plan to strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood control over the state 
and change its identity.    
 The ―violence‖ frame emphasized the potential violent nature of Islamic groups 
whether violence actually occurred or not, describing them as expressing anger, and 
hostility, and threatening people. If violence occurred, their potential involvement is 
highlighted; they are accused of killing and injuring people, and damaging properties. 
They are also introduced as sympathizers with terrorists. The frame is marked by use of 
war vocabulary even when describing non-violent incidents. 
 The ―anti-revolution‖ frame depicted Islamic groups as standing against the 
January 25
th
 revolution, deceiving the revolutionaries, wasting revolutions‘ gains and 
betraying the martyrs. They also were presented as having secret deals with the previous 
regime, its remnants or the SCAF, and sabotaging the revolution from the youth for their 
own benefit.  
 The ―anti-modernity‖ frame depicted Islamists as a threat to the Egyptian identity; 
showing them as medieval in their lifestyle and thinking, as opposing culture, arts and 
literature, as fanatics who provoke sectarian clashes. They are also presented as primitive, 
ignorant, blindly obeying their leaders and easily deceived 
 The ―internal conflict‖ frame divided Islamic groups like the Muslim Brotherhood 
to old guards and new guards or conservatives and reformers, and supposed that Islamic 
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groups‘ youth always rebel against their leaders. It also labeled any disagreement among 
different Islamic groups as a major conflict where each group deems the other un-Islamic. 
 The ―hypocrisy‖ frame represented Islamists as non-devout corrupt un-credible 
Muslims who use religious symbols to deceive people and reach power. They were also 
depicted as anti-Al-Azhar, the official highly-respected Egyptian religious institution. 
 The ―conspiracy/treason‖ frame illustrated Islamic groups as part of a regional or 
international conspiracy against Egypt involving different parties and countries ranging 
from Hamas and Hizbollah to Qatar, the US and Israel. They were presented as having 
hidden agendas and depending on external sources of finance, along with affiliating to 
global networks. 
 The ―polarization‖ frame is similar to the often-used conflict frame, but in the 
Egyptian case it framed events in Egyptian transition as an ongoing battle between two 
conflicting side: Islamists and the rest of the political forces, or in extreme cases, the 
whole society. It focused on extreme views, classifying them to pro and anti-Islamists.  
 The ―reconciliation‖ frame is the opposite of the polarization frame which the 
variety of political positions and focused on the unity of Egyptians in national issues.  
 The ―politically organized‖ frame emphasized the organizational capabilities and 
political outreach of Islamists. And the ―victims of Mubarak regime‖ viewed Islamists as 
victims of oppression under Mubarak and his state security apparatus.  
 In order to reveal the dominant frames of Islamic groups in Egyptian newspapers, 
different framing devices and techniques were examined including the content of the 
photo, the type of sources quoted or paraphrased, the labels used with Islamists and their 
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opponents, and the news story direction towards Islamists mentioned in it. This resulted 
in the following main research question: 
RQ: How did Egyptian newspapers frame Egyptian Islamic groups in general, and the 
Muslim Brotherhood/FJP and the Salafi Call/Al-Nour in particular in the two years 
following January 25
th
 revolution? And does this framing differ across newspapers 
ownership types, degrees of media professionalism, time periods of changing political 
roles of Islamists, or Islamic groups themselves?  
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
 This study used content analysis to examine the framing of Islamic movements in 
Egyptian newspapers in the two years following the Egyptian revolution from 12 
February 2011, the day after Mubarak stepped down, to 12 February 2013. Four 
newspapers were analyzed: the state-owned Al-Ahram and three private newspapers: Al-
Masry Al-Youm, Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘, and Al-Dostor. The leading state paper was 
selected because it represents one measure of the government‘s official position, and 
three different private newspapers were selected because they represent a diversity of 
views and positions, and, as discussed below, reflect varying norms of professionalism.  
 Al-Ahram (The Pyramids) is one of the oldest Egyptian newspapers established in 
1875 (Cooper, 2008) and the highest in circulation with around 180 - 190 thousand copies 
daily (Employee at the Information and Decision Support Center of the Egyptian 
Government - IDSC, personal communication, June 20, 2013). It is largely considered as 
representative of state-owned newspapers (Elmasry, 2011). Al-Ahram, and state media in 
general, have always performed as the mouthpiece of government, with a special focus on 
coverage of government actions (Cooper, 2008; Iskandar, 2012). Therefore it is expected 
that the change to an Islamist government after the revolution would yield a 
corresponding change in the framing of Islamists – from negative to more positive – in 
Al-Ahram.  
 Previous studies indicated that framing differ among newspapers according to the 
level of sensationalism (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000), thus three private newspapers 
were chosen according to their level in professional and ethical practices as classified by 
the Supreme Press Council (SPC) in Egypt (Hamada, Al-Ghaly, Al-Azrak, & Fikry, 
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2013). According to the SPC, Al-Dostor was the highest among Egyptian newspapers in 
violating professional and ethical standards (7 – 12 violations per issue); Al-Masry Al-
Youm was moderate (3 – 6.99 violations per issue) while Al-Youm Al-Sabea was less in 
its violations (1 – 1.99 violations per issue), finally Al-Ahram was the least violator of 
professional and ethical standards (0 – 0.99 violations per issue). But Al-Ahram is far 
from being the hero of journalism standards in Egypt as indicated by prior scholarship. It 
has always been government-centered in its coverage (Elmasry, 2012), and its driving 
news value appear to be ‗nationalism‘ (Cooper, 2008) which might run against 
professional standards.  
 Al-Masry Al-Youm (The Egyptian Today) is the first Egyptian private newspaper 
since the 1952 revolution, and the highest in circulation among private newspapers with 
around 150 - 160 thousand copies daily (IDSC employee, personal communication, June 
20, 2013) which enables it to compete with Al-Ahram. Al-Masry Al-Youm is owned by 
some Egyptian business men including Salah Diab (Ahram Online, 2011), and Naguib 
Sawiris the founder of the liberal Free Egyptians party (Baker & Kassem, 2011).  Its 
coverage of Islamists during Mubarak era has led to the last military trial of Muslim 
Brotherhood members before the revolution. In 2006, it claimed that the MB has militias 
in a news story on a group of MB-affiliated university students who organized a parade in 
Al-Azhar University (AlBehairy, 2006). The paper provided an excuse for a following 
Mubarak‘s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood accusing them of organizing militia 
that attempted to overthrow the regime (Al-Khatib, 2007). Al-Masry Al-Youm is 
regarded as more flexible in its political coverage from other types of newspapers 
ownership in Egypt, thus providing good indicator for the change in the media after the 
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revolution (Rayman, 2013). Moreover, Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm can be 
considered as the mainstream Egyptian newspapers as defined by Chomsky in 1997. 
They have the highest circulation, and they are owned by big corporations. They are the 
―agenda-setting…elite media which sets the framework within which others operate‖ 
(Chomsky, 1997).  
 Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (The Seventh Day) is a private newspaper that began weekly 
in 2008 and turned daily since May 31, 2011(Youm7.com, 2013). Mohammad Al-Amin, 
the owner of 16 private satellite channels who is known for his relations with prominent 
figures in Mubarak regime, and ―accused by many of backing Mubarak's entourage‖ 
(Ibrahim, 2012) is one of the partners in Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (Solayman, 2011). Also 
partners in Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ are Mohamed El-Morshidy, another businessman under 
Mubarak‘s regime, and Alaa El-Kahky, the owner of Media Line Advertising Agency 
(Solayman, 2011). Despite its low circulation number of around 24 thousand (IDSC 
employee, personal communication, June 20, 2013), Al-Youm Al-Sabea is ranked as the 
first Egyptian news website on the internet (Alexa, 2013; Google Zeitgeist, 2012).  
 Al-Dostor (The Constitution) was republished in 2005 by its editor and founder 
Ibrahim Essa. In 2010, Al-Wafd party leader purchased the paper and sacked Essa in a 
move that was widely criticized (Peterson, 2011; El-Daragli & El-Gamal, 2010a). He 
later sold his share to Reda Edward another prominent Al-Wafd leader (El-Daragli & El-
Gamal, 2010b). Paper circulation figures dropped sharply and its editorial policy changed 
from liberal opposition to anti-revolutionary (Al-Iraqi, 2010; Ali, 2012). The paper is 
currently known for its anti-MB editorial policy (Egypt Independent, 2012a).  
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 Content Analysis is defined as ―a research technique for the systematic, 
replicable, and quantitative description of the manifest or latent features of 
communication texts‖ (Baxter & Babbie, 2003, p. 240). Four composite weeks – four 
randomly selected Sundays, Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, Fridays, and 
Saturdays – were selected from the study‘s two-year time period. According to Riffe and 
Aust (1993, p. 139) two composite weeks are ‗reliable estimates‘ of one year of coverage 
of a daily newspaper. The 28 days were selected using a random calendar date generator 
(Random.org) by randomly selecting two Saturdays from the first year and two Saturdays 
from the second year, and the same with the rest of week‘s days. The final sample 
included the following days: 
Year one from Feb 12, 2011 – Feb, 12, 2012 
 Saturday, 7 January 2012 
Saturday, 28 January 2012 
 Sunday, 9 October 2011 
Sunday, 30 October 2011 
 Monday, 4 July 2011 
Monday, 12 September 2011 
 Tuesday, 19 April 2011 
Tuesday, 14 June 2011 
 Wednesday, 13 April 2011 
Wednesday, 18 May 2011 
 Thursday, 31 March 2011 
Thursday, 30 June 2011 
 Friday, 1 April 2011 
Friday, 23 December 2011 
 
Year two from Feb, 12, 2012 – Feb 12, 2013 
 Saturday, 25 February 2012 
Saturday, 28 July 2012 
 Sunday, 4 November 2012 
Sunday, 27 January 2013 
 Monday, 2 July 2012 
Monday, 4 February 2013 
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 Tuesday, 28 August 2012 
Tuesday, 27 November 2012 
 Wednesday, 11 April 2012 
Wednesday, 28 November 2012 
 Thursday, 4 October 2012 
Thursday, 15 November 2012 
 Friday, 4 May 2012 
Friday, 22 June 2012 
 
 Since one of the studied newspapers, Al-Youm Al-Sabea, was issued weekly until 
the mid of 2011, the nearest weekly issues were selected to replace the missing days in 
that period. This resulted in including the 2011 weekly issues of Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ on 
March 29, April 5, 12, 19, May 17, July 5 and 12 in the final sample.  
 The unit of analysis was every front-page news story which referred to Islamists. 
Since information is made salient through place and space (Entman, 1993), front-page 
news stories can be regarded as one of the most salient framing devices in a newspaper 
issue because they represent what the newspaper considers most important (Elmasry, 
2012). They reflect differences in editorial policies, and they are also the most read part 
in a newspaper. In the case of Al-Dostor newspaper, the front-page is usually a cover 
with headlines only, so the first page that included news stories – the third page in this 
case – was analyzed instead.  
 The sample included all front-page news stories that referred to Islamists in 
general, to the Muslim Brotherhood/the Freedom and Justice Party or the Salafi Call/Al-
Nour party in particular in the headline, sub-headlines, the three first paragraphs, and the 
photo or the photo caption. The MB and the Salafi Call were chosen because their 
respective parties, FJP and Al-Nour, came first in the parliamentary elections in both 
upper and lower houses (Carnegie, 2012). The final sample included 197 news stories: 22 
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from Al-Ahram, 45 from Al-Masry al-Youm, 55 from Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ and 75 from 
Al-Dostor. 
 For each front-page news story, the researcher analyzed topic choice, Islamists 
mentioned, content of photo, labels used with Islamists and their opponents, types of 
source quoted or paraphrased in addition to the dominant news frame and its direction 
towards each Islamic movement mentioned in the story. Two independent coders – both 
are graduate students of social sciences at the American University in Cairo -- were 
trained on the coding scheme (Appendix A) before analyzing a sub-sample of 29 news 
stories. All variables except one scored more than 0.7 in Scott‘s Pi as a measurement of 
the inter-coder reliability (Appendix B). They were mostly centered around .9. Only one 
variable scored below .7 – 0.653 – which is considered ―acceptable‖ (Shoemaker, 2003). 
It was whether Salafi parties other than the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party were mentioned in 
the news stories. Further explanation of which parties/movements are considered Salafi 
were added to the coding scheme to ease classification.  
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V. RESULS 
 Of the 28 examined front pages for each of the four studied newspapers, it was 
found that Al-Dostor referred to Islamists on its front-page news stories more than the 
three other papers with 75 (38%) articles compared to 55 (27.9%) in Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ 
and 45 (22.8%) in Al-Masry Al-Youm, while Al-Ahram was the least to refer to Islamists 
in its front-page news articles (11.2%, n = 22).  
Topic 
 Islamic groups were mainly covered in front-page news stories on protests, sit-ins 
and strikes (18.8%, n = 37), elections or referendums (13.2%, n = 26), violence - whether 
from police/military, among protestors or sectarian violence - (9.6%, n = 19), news 
stories on politicians activities and statements (8.6%, n = 17), international relations 
(7.1%, n = 14), and religious affairs (6.6%, n =13).  
 There was no significant difference among the four newspapers in their choice of 
front-page topics where Islamists were mentioned, χ2 (48, N = 197) = 50.71, p = .37 (See 
Table 1). But some important differences existed. Al-Ahram was the highest to feature 
Islamists in topics related to protests, sit-ins and strikes (27.3%, n = 6) followed by Al-
Dostor (20%, n = 15), Al-Youm Al-Sabea (16.4%, n = 9), and Al-Masry Al-Youm 
(15.6%, n = 7). Al-Ahram was also more likely to mention Islamists in stories of 
elections or referendums (27.3%, n = 6), than Al-Masry Al-Youm (15.6%, n = 7), Al-
Youm Al-Sabea‘ (12.7%, n =7) and Al-Dostor (8%, n = 6). Al-Masry Al-Youm referred 
to Islamists more in news stories on violence (15.6%, n = 7) more than Al-Youm Al-
Sabea‘ (9.1%, n = 5), Al-Ahram (9.1%, n = 2), or Al-Dostor (6.7%, n = 5). Also Al-
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Dostor covered Islamists on stories related to crime (10.7%, n = 8) more than other 
newspapers: Al-Masry Al-Youm (4.4%, n = 2), and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (1.8%, n = 1).   
Table 1 
Differences in Topics according to Newspaper 
Topic Newspaper Total 
Al-Ahram Al-Masry Al-
Youm 
Al-Youm Al-
Sabea' 
Al-Dostor 
 
Protests, sit-ins & strikes 
6 7 9 15 37 
 27.3% 15.6% 16.4% 20.0% 18.8% 
 
Elections /Referendums 
6 7 7 6 26 
 27.3% 15.6% 12.7% 8.0% 13.2% 
 Violence (police, 
protestors & sectarian) 
2 7 5 5 19 
 9.1% 15.6% 9.1% 6.7% 9.6% 
 Politicians statements & 
activities 
0 3 5 9 17 
 0.0% 6.7% 9.1% 12.0% 8.6% 
 
Foreign Affairs 
1 2 6 5 14 
4.5% 4.4% 10.9% 6.7% 7.1% 
Religious Affairs, trends 
0 3 6 4 13 
0.0% 6.7% 10.9% 5.3% 6.6% 
Constitution, Constituent 
Assembly 
2 3 5 2 12 
9.1% 6.7% 9.1% 2.7% 6.1% 
Law/Judicial Bodies 
2 4 1 4 11 
9.1% 8.9% 1.8% 5.3% 5.6% 
Crime 
0 2 1 8 11 
0.0% 4.4% 1.8% 10.7% 5.6% 
Presidency decisions 
/actions 
1 5 2 2 10 
4.5% 11.1% 3.6% 2.7% 5.1% 
Political parties 
1 2 2 5 10 
4.5% 4.4% 3.6% 6.7% 5.1% 
Political meetings 
0 0 2 2 4 
0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 2.7% 2.0% 
Legislative bodies 
0 0 1 3 4 
0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 4.0% 2.0% 
Total 
 22 45 55 75 197 
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
χ2 (48, N = 197) = 50.71, p = .37 
72 
 
Islamists covered 
 The Muslim Brotherhood, or its political wing the Freedom and Justice Party, was 
the most covered Islamic movement in the sampled newspapers (See Table 2, Figure 1). 
It was mentioned in 79.2% (n = 156) of the sample. Islamists in general with no 
specifications were mentioned in (31%, n = 61) of the sample, including 24 articles 
(12.18% of the total sample) that referred to the Salafis in general with no specifications. 
The Salafi Call or its political wing Al-Noor Party was identified in 20.3% (n = 40) of the 
news stories. Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya or its Al-Binaa w Al-Tanmia party came in the 
fourth place (11.2%, n = 22). Other Salafi parties and groups like Al-Asala, Al-Fadial, 
Al-Watan or the Salafi Front received less coverage (5.6%, n = 11), along with Al-Wasat 
party (4.1%, n = 8), and Hazem Abu Ismail supporters (3%, n = 6). One article mentioned 
Al-Haya al-Shariyya lil-Haquq wa-l Islah (the Islamic Legitimate Body of Rights and 
Reform); it was in Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘. 
Figure 1 
Frequency of mentioning different Islamic movements 
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Table 2 
Frequency of Islamic movements and parties mentioned in different newspapers 
Islamic Group Al-
Ahram 
Al-Masry 
Al-Youm 
Al-Youm 
Al-Sabea‘ 
Al-Dostor Total 
MB/FJP 20 
(90.9%) 
39 
(86.7%) 
38 
(69.1%) 
59 
(78.7%) 
156 
(79.2%) 
The Islamists or The 
Salafis 
5 
(22.7%) 
16 
(35.6%) 
23 
(41.8%) 
17 
(22.7%) 
61 
 (31%) 
The Salafi Call/Al-Noor 
party 
10 
(45.5%) 
16 
(35.6%) 
8 
(14.5%) 
6 
(8%) 
40  
(20.3% 
Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya 5 
(22.7%) 
4 
 (8.9%) 
6  
(10.9%) 
7 
 (9.3%) 
22 
(11.2%) 
Other Salafi groups 2 
(9.1%) 
3  
(6.7%) 
2 
 (3.6%) 
4  
(5.3%) 
11  
(5.6%) 
Al-Wasat Party 2 
(9.1%) 
3  
(6.7%) 
3 
 (5.5) 
0 8  
(4.1%) 
Abu Ismail Supporters 2 
(9.1%) 
2  
(4.4%) 
1  
(1.8%) 
1  
(1.3%) 
6  
(3%) 
 No statistically significant difference was found between the four newspapers in 
mentioning the Muslim Brotherhood, χ2 (3, N = 197) = 6.78, p = .08. However, Al-
Ahram mentioned them in 90% (n = 5, n = 20) of its sampled articles, followed by Al-
Masry Al-Youm (86.7%, n = 39), then Al-Dostor (78.7%, n = 59) and Al-Youm Al-
Sabea‘ (69.1%, n = 38).  
 Differences between the four newspapers in mentioning Islamists in general with 
no specifications (including the general reference to the Salafis) were not statistically 
significant, χ2 (3, N = 197) = 6.59, p = .09. However, telling differences existed. Al-
Youm Al-Sabea‘ and Al-Masry Al-Youm were more likely to mention Islamists in 
general in 41.8% (n = 23) and 35.6% (n = 16) of their articles respectively. This is much 
more than Al-Ahram and Al-Dostor (22.7% of the articles for each) which apparently 
prefer to specify the Islamic group they are talking about.  
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 There was also no significant difference among the four newspapers in covering 
other Islamic groups except for The Salafi Call and its Al-Noor party, χ2 (3, N = 197) = 
23.21, p = .00. Al-Ahram mentioned The Salafi Call/Al-Noor party in almost half of its 
front-page news stories on Islamists (45.5%, n = 10), more than Al-Masry Al-Youm did 
(35.6%, n = 16) and far more than Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (14.5%, n = 8) or Al-Dostor (8%, 
n = 6). 
 Although no statistically significant differences were found among the four 
studied newspapers in mentioning Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya, χ2 (3, N = 197) = 6.78, p = 
.08. Al-Ahram was more likely to mention it in 22.7% (n= 5) of its articles, almost twice 
as Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (10.9%, n = 6), Al-Dostor (9.3%, n = 7) and Al-Masry Al-Youm 
(8.9%, n = 4). The same with Al-Wasat party, it was more mentioned in Al-Ahram 
(9.1%, n = 2), than Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘. Al-Dostor never 
mentioned Al-Wasat in its stories on Islamists.  
Photo Content 
 Of all 197 news stories analyzed, a total of 70.6% (n = 139) had photos published 
with them. Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ published photos with its front-page news articles on 
Islamists more than the three other newspapers (90.9%, n = 50), followed by Al-Masry 
Al-Youm (84.4%, n = 38). Al-Dostor came third with 58.7% (n = 44), and finally Al-
Ahram (31.8%, n = 7). These differences were found statistically significant, χ2 (3, N = 
197) = 36.14, p = .00 
 Overall, personal photos were dominant (56.8%, n = 79) except for Al-Ahram 
(0%), followed by photos of protests (19.4%, n = 27), then photos of political meetings 
(5.8%, n = 8). 
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  Data analysis revealed significant difference among the sampled newspapers in 
the content of the photo that accompanied front-page news stories on Islamic movements, 
χ2 (42, N = 139) = 90.08, p = .00, especially in relation to protests and personal photos 
(See Table 3). The majority of Al-Dostor photos were personal (70.5%, n = 31), followed 
by Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (56%, n = 28), then Al-Masry Al-Youm (52.6%, n = 20). Al-
Ahram didn‘t display personal photos at all, but was far more likely to publish protest 
photos (42.9%, n = 3) followed by Al-Masry Al-Youm (23.7%, n = 9) than Al-Youm Al-
Sabea‘ (16%, n = 8) and Al-Dostor (15.9%, n = 7). Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ was the highest 
among the sampled newspapers to publish photos of political meetings (12%, n = 6) far 
more than Al-Masry Al-Youm (2.6%, n = 1) or Al-Dostor (2.3%, n = 1), Al-Ahram never 
did so. 
Table 3 
Difference among newspapers in content of first photo in new articles on Islamists 
Photo Content 
Newspaper 
Total Al-Ahram Al-Masry 
Al-Youm 
Al-Youm 
Al-Sabea' 
Al-Dostor 
Personal 
0 20 28 31 79 
0.0% 52.6% 56.0% 70.5% 56.8% 
Protest 
3 9 8 7 27 
42.9% 23.7% 16.0% 15.9% 19.4% 
Political meetings, press 
conferences  
0 1 6 1 8 
0.0% 2.6% 12.0% 2.3% 5.8% 
Elections, referendums 
1 1 2 0 4 
14.3% 2.6% 4.0% 0.0% 2.9% 
Sit-in, strike 
0 3 0 0 3 
0.0% 7.9% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 
Violence 
2 1 0 0 3 
28.6% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 
Military Vehicles 
0 1 1 1 3 
0.0% 2.6% 2.0% 2.3% 2.2% 
Shrines and rituals 
0 0 3 0 3 
0.0% 0.0% 6.0% 0.0% 2.2% 
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Legislative bodies 
0 0 0 2 2 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.5% 1.4% 
Previous issue of the 
Newspaper 
0 0 1 1 2 
0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 2.3% 1.4% 
Other photos 
1 2 1 1 5 
14.3% 5.2% 2.0% 2.3% 3.5% 
Total 
7 38 50 44 139 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
χ2 (42, N = 139) = 90.08, p = .00 
Reference to Islamists 
  The newspapers used a variety of keywords to refer to Islamists. Only the first 
mention of Islamists in the front-page news article was coded (starting with the headline, 
sub-headline, then the lead and the rest of the article). The majority of the sampled front-
page news articles (65.5%, n = 129) referred to Islamic groups with their official names: 
Party or movement official name like the MB/FJP, or personal political titles when 
referring to people (See Figure 2). They also referred to them less but equally as ―the 
Salafis‖ (10.2% (n = 20), or as ―Islamists, Islamic trends/forces/movements/groups, or 
religious trends/forces‖ in 9.6% (n = 19).  
  A number of the news articles (8.2%, n = 16) referred to Islamists with labels 
implying anti-democratic attitudes like exclusion and dictatorship including the MB 
Guide rule or the MB state in 4.1% of the total sample (n = 8), the Brotherhoodization of 
the state (1%, n = 2), the MB Constitution, and the MB‘s General Prosecutor with 0.5% 
(n = 1) for each. This category also included a set of references to President Morsi 
describing him as working only for the Brotherhood, like the MB‘s Morsi (1%, n = 2), 
Morsi‘s Group and the MB representative in Presidency (0.5% , n = 1) for each. Most of 
these references were used in Al-Dostor (11 out of 16), especially ―the Guide rule‖ 
(9.3%, n = 7). 
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  Two Al-Dostor articles used the term ―the Group‖ (1%, n = 2), which was the 
name of a popular controversial TV show on the MB produced under Mubarak. Al-
Dostor also referred to them with labels implying violence like ―the terrorist militia‖, ―the 
hired MB‖; one news article for each. Another Al-Dostor article referred to Islamists as 
―the darkness trend‖ (0.5%).  
  Three articles mentioned ―the MB youth or the Salafi Youth‖, one in each of Al-
Ahram, Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘. In one instance a prominent Salafi 
preacher was referred to as ―the highest commander of anti-revolution forces‖ in Al-
Youm Al-Sabea‘. Another Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ article referred to the Salafis as Ahl As-
Sunnah wa Al-Jamaʻah (Sunni Muslims), which was also used once in Al-Dostor. 
Islamists were also referred to as ―the Majority trend‖ in one of Al-Dostor news stories. 
Figure 2 
Frequency of labels used with Islamic movements 
 
  Although differences in labels used to refer to Islamists among the four studied 
newspapers were not statistically significant, χ2 (51, N = 197) = 55.42, p = .31 (See Table 
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4), some telling differences were found. Al-Ahram was the most likely to be specific in 
naming Islamists using their official name in 77.3% (n = 17) similar to Al-Masry Al-
Youm (71.1%, n = 32), then Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (61.8%, n = 34), and Al-Dostor (61.3%, 
n = 46). Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ devoted considerable share of its Islamists‘ coverage to ―the 
Salafis‖ in general, referring to them in 20% of its front-page news stories (n = 11), 
followed by Al-Dostor which used the term in 8% (n = 6) of its sample. Al-Ahram didn‘t 
use the term ―the Salafis‖ at all, preferring a specific reference to the covered Salafi party. 
Al-Masry Al-Youm was the highest in using the label of ―Islamists, Islamic 
trends/forces/groups, or religious trends/forces‖ (15.6%, n = 7) followed by Al-Ahram 
(13.6%, n = 3), then Al-Dostor (8%, n = 6) and finally Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (5.5%, n = 3). 
Al-Masry Al-Youm also used the labels ―the MB Guide rule‖ and ―Brotherhoodization of 
the state‖ in one news story for each.  
Table 4 
Differences in reference to Islamists 
Label Newspaper Total 
Al-Ahram 
Al-Masry 
Al-Youm 
Al-Youm 
Al-Sabea' 
Al-Dostor 
Official name 
17 32 34 46 129 
77.3% 71.1% 61.8% 61.3% 65.5% 
Salafis 
0 3 11 6 20 
0.0% 6.7% 20.0% 8.0% 10.2% 
Islamists, Islamic or 
religious  forces/trends 
3 7 3 6 19 
13.6% 15.6% 5.5% 8.0% 9.6% 
The Guide Rule 
0 1 0 7 8 
0.0% 2.2% 0.0% 9.3% 4.1% 
MB's  Morsi/Morsi‘s 
Group/ MB representative 
in Presidency 
0 0 1 3 4 
0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 4% 2% 
Brotherhoodization, MB's 0 1 2 1 4 
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General Prosecutor, MB 
Constitution 
0.0% 2.2% 3.6% 1.3% 2% 
MB youth/Salafi Youth 
1 1 1 0 3 
4.5% 2.2% 1.8% 0.0% 1.5% 
Ahl As-sunnah w Al-
Jama‘ah  
0 0 1 1 2 
0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 1.3% 1.0% 
the Group 
0 0 0 2 2 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.7% 1.0% 
Militia/s, Terrorist/s 
0 0 0 1 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 0.5% 
the Hired 
0 0 0 1 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 0.5% 
The Darkness Trend 
0 0 0 1 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 0.5% 
The highest commander of 
anti-revolution forces 
0 0 1 0 1 
0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 0.0% 0.5% 
The Majority‘s trend 
0 0 1 0 1 
0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 0.0% 0.5% 
MB Lawyers 
1 0 0 0 1 
4.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 
Total 
45 55 75 197 45 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
χ2 (51, N = 197) = 55.42, p = .31 
Reference to Opponents of Islamists 
 Islamists opponents were mentioned in 66% (n = 130) of the sampled news stories 
on Islamists. Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm were more likely to mention Islamists 
opponents with (72%, n = 16) and (71.1%, n = 32) of their articles respectively. Al-Youm 
Al-Sabea‘ also mentioned Islamists‘ opponents in 63.6% (n = 35) of its articles, a little 
more than Al-Dostor (62.7%, n = 47). Such differences were not statistically significant, 
χ2 (3, N = 197) = 1.48, p = .69. 
 The sampled news papers employed a variety of labels when referring to Islamists 
opponents (See Figure 3). Only the first occurring label was coded. Among the front-page 
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news stories that mentioned opponent of Islamists (N = 130), a total of 40.8% (n = 53) 
referred to them with their official names: Party or movement official name or official 
political title. They were also frequently referred to as ―revolutionary groups, youth or 
youth movements‖ in 11.5% (n = 15), as ―political forces‖ in 9.2% (n = 12), as 
―protestors/the square‖ in 6.2% (n = 8), and as ―civil forces/trends‖ in 5.4% (n = 7). 
Professional titles were used to label Islamists opponents in 6.2% (n = 8) of the articles, 
including ―experts‖ 3.1% (n = 4), ―lawyer/s‖ (2.3%, n = 3), and ―workers‖ (0.8%, n = 1). 
Other labels appeared less frequently like ―the Church/Coptic/Copts in Diaspora‖ 3.1% (n 
=4), and ―the people, citizens, or residents‖ (2.3%, n = 3). Each of the following labels 
appeared twice (1.5%, n = 2) in the total sampled stories that mentioned opponents of 
Islamists: ―national forces‖, ―remnants of Mubarak regime or NDP candidates‖, ―Sufis‖, 
―Leftists and Liberals‖, and ―judges clubs‖. Some labels appeared once including: ―public 
figures‖, ―the SCAF‖, ―the Advisory Council‖, ―State security police‖, ―ex-Brotherhood 
members‖, ―Member of Parliament‖, ―Sinai Tribes‖ and ―unidentified people‖.  
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Figure 3 
Frequency of labels used with Islamists’ opponents 
 
 No significant difference was found among the four newspapers in their use of 
references to opponents of Islamists, χ2 (72, N = 130) = 74.59, p = .4. However, some 
categories were preferred more than others in each of the newspapers sampled (See Table 
5). The official name was the most repeated reference to Islamists‘ opponents in all four 
newspapers, but Al-Ahram was more likely to use it (68.8%, n = 11), followed by Al-
Youm Al-Sabea‘ (45.7%, n = 16), then Al-Masry Al-Youm (37.5%, n = 12) and Al-
Dostor (29.8%, n = 14). Al-Masry Al-Youm also named Islamists‘ opponents as 
―revolutionaries or youth movements‖ in 21.9% (n = 7) of the articles followed by Al-
Dostor in 10.6% (n = 5) and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (8.6%, n = 3), while Al-Ahram never 
used the term. ―Protestors‖ was also used in 12.5% of Al-Masry Al-Youm stories (n = 4), 
far more than the three other newspapers. On the contrary, opponents of Islamists were 
referred to as ―political forces‖ in 25% of Al-Ahram sample (n = 4), and 11.4% of Al-
Youm Al-Sabea‘ sample (n = 4). 
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Table 5 
Differences in reference to Islamists’ opponents 
Label Newspaper Total 
Al-Ahram Al-Masry Al-
Youm 
Al-Youm Al-
Sabea' 
Al-Dostor 
Official names 
11 12 16 14 53 
68.8% 37.5% 45.7% 29.8% 40.8% 
Revolutionary or  Youth 
groups/forces/movements 
0 7 3 5 15 
0.0% 21.9% 8.6% 10.6% 11.5% 
Political forces 
4 1 4 3 12 
25.0% 3.1% 11.4% 6.4% 9.2% 
Protestors 
0 4 1 3 8 
0.0% 12.5% 2.9% 6.4% 6.2% 
Civil Trends, forces 
0 3 2 2 7 
0.0% 9.4% 5.7% 4.3% 5.4% 
The Church/ Copts in 
Diaspora 
0 0 3 1 4 
0.0% 0.0% 8.6% 2.1% 3.1% 
Experts 
0 0 1 3 4 
0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 6.4% 3.1% 
Lawyer 
0 0 0 3 3 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.4% 2.3% 
The People, Citizens, 
Residents 
0 1 0 2 3 
0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 4.3% 2.3% 
Leftists and Liberals 
0 0 2 0 2 
0.0% 0.0% 5.7% 0.0% 1.5% 
Judges clubs 
1 0 1 0 2 
6.2% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0% 1.5% 
National forces 
0 0 0 2 2 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.3% 1.5% 
Sufis 
0 1 1 0 2 
0.0% 3.1% 2.9% 0.0% 1.5% 
Remnants of Mubarak 
regime, NDP Candidates 
0 1 0 1 2 
0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 2.1% 1.5% 
Workers 
0 0 0 1 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 0.8% 
Public Figures 
0 1 0 0 1 
0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 
Other 
0 1 1 2 9 
0 02.1% 2.9% 14.9% 6.9% 
Total 16 32 35 47 130 
χ2 (72, N = 130) = 74.59, p = .4 
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Sourcing 
 Sources that were quoted or cited in front-page news stories on Islamists were 
coded into three groups: Islamist, neutral, anti-Islamist sources. The decision to 
participate in June 30, 2013 protests was the criterion used in sources‘ classification; 
those who announced they would participate were considered ―anti-Islamists‖, those who 
didn‘t declare a clear position were categorized as ―neutral‖ which also included 
government officials if they were technocrats and not politicians, citizens, and 
eyewitnesses, while Islamist sources are the groups previously specified in the study. 
Some news articles quoted or paraphrased more than one of the categories of sources, 
while other articles didn‘t cite any source at all.  
 More than half of front-page news articles on Islamists didn‘t quote or paraphrase 
them. They were quoted in (47.7%) of the articles (n = 94). Differences among the four 
sampled newspapers in quoting Islamist sources were found to be statistically significant, 
χ2 (3, N = 197) = 13.84, p = .003 (See Table 6). Al-Masry Al-Youm was the highest 
among the four newspapers with 64.4% (n = 29) of its articles including quotes or 
paraphrasing from Islamists sources, followed by Al-Ahram (59.1%, n = 13), then Al-
Youm Al-Sabea‘ (50.9%, n = 28). Islamists‘ voice was overshadowed in Al-Dostor with 
only 32% (n = 24) of its news stories on Islamists actually quoting or citing them. 
 More than half of the sampled news stories cited anti-Islamist sources (52.2%, n = 
103), compared to 47.7% (n = 94) that cited Islamist sources. Differences among 
newspapers were not statistically significant, χ2 (3, N = 197) =.82, p = .85 (See Table 6). 
Al-Masry Al-Youm quoted or cited anti-Islamist sources much more than the other 
papers (57.8%, n = 26). Al-Dostor also cited anti-Islamist sources in 52% (n = 39) of 
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their articles. Half of Al- Ahram sample cited anti-Islamist sources (50%, n = 11), similar 
to Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (49.1%, n = 27). 
 Neutral sources were the least quoted or paraphrased among the four sampled 
newspapers. A total of 36.5% (n = 72) of the sample quoted neutral sources in their front-
page news stories dealing with Islamists. But differences among the four sampled 
newspapers were statistically significant, χ2 (3, N = 197) = 9.45, p = .02 (See Table 6). 
Al-Masry Al-Youm sample was more likely to quote neutral sources (55.6%, n = 25), 
much more than Al-Ahram (36.4%, n = 8), Al-Dostor (30.7%, n = 23), and Al-Youm Al-
Sabea‘ (29.1%, n = 16). 
Table 6 
Frequency of sources quoted or paraphrased in news articles on Islamists 
Source Al-Ahram Al-Masry 
Al-Youm 
Al-Youm 
Al-Sabea' 
Al-Dostor Total 
Anti-Islamists 11 26 27 39 103 
50% 57.8% 49.1% 52% 52.3% 
Islamists 13 29 28 24 94 
59.1% 64.4% 50.9% 32% 47.7% 
Neutral 8 25 16 23 72 
36.4% 55.6% 29.1% 30.7% 36.5% 
Coverage Direction towards Islamists  
The Muslim Brotherhood/Freedom and Justice Party 
 Of the 156 news stories that mentioned the MB/FJP in the sample, a total of 
55.8% (n = 87) viewed them negatively, compared to 41% (n = 64) neutrally, and only 
3.2% (n = 5) positively (See Table 8, Figure 4).  
 Statistically significant differences were found among the four newspapers in 
their coverage tone towards the Muslim Brotherhood, χ2 (6, N = 156) = 40.24, p = .00 
(See Table 7). Al-Dostor coverage tone of the MB was overwhelmingly negative (81.4%, 
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n = 48). Almost half of Al-Masry Al-Youm front-page news stories covered the 
Brotherhood negatively (51.3%, n = 20), more than neutrally (41%, n = 16). Al-Ahram 
was more likely to cover them in a neutral way (90%, n = 18). Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ 
covered them neutrally (52.6%, n = 20) slightly more than negatively (44.7%, n = 17). No 
news story was positive towards the MB/FJP in Al-Ahram, only one was found in each of 
Al-Dostor and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘, while Al-Masry Al-Youm was the highest among the 
four papers to cover then positively in 7.7% (n = 3) of its articles. 
Table 7 
Differences among newspapers in coverage direction towards the MB/FJP 
Direction Newspaper Total 
Al-Ahram Al-Masry 
Al-Youm 
Al-Youm 
Al-Sabea' 
Al-Dostor 
 
Positive 0 3 1 1 5 
0.0% 7.7% 2.6% 1.7% 3.2% 
Neutral 18 16 20 10 64 
90.0% 41.0% 52.6% 16.9% 41.0% 
Negative 2 20 17 48 87 
10.0% 51.3% 44.7% 81.4% 55.8% 
Total 20 39 38 59 156 
χ2 (6, N = 156) = 40.24, p = .00 
 The Salafi Call/Al-Noor Party 
 A total of 20.3% (n = 40) front-page news articles referred to the Salafi Call or its 
political wing Al-Noor Party. Coverage tone was neutral in around two thirds (65%, n = 
26) of these news articles (See Table 8, Figure 4). The rest (35%, n = 14) viewed the 
Salafi Call or Al-Noor party in a negative manner. No single article was found to be 
favorable towards the Salafi Call or its Al-Noor party.  
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 Data analysis revealed no statistically significant difference among the four 
studied newspapers in their coverage tone towards the Salafi Call or its Al-Noor party, χ2 
(3, N = 40) = 6.67, p = .08. But some considerable differences can be highlighted. Al-
Ahram news articles mentioning the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party were all neutral. Al-Youm 
Al-Sabea‘ was far more neutral (62.5%, n = 5) than negative (37.5%, n = 3). On the 
contrary, around half of the news articles in Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Dostor was 
negative (56.2%, n = 9) and (50%, n = 3) respectively, and the other half was neutral. 
Other Salafi parties and movements 
 A total of 80% (n = 9) of the 11 news articles that mentioned Salafi parties and 
movements like Al-Asala, Al-Fadila, Al-Watan and the Salafi Front were neutral with 
only 2 news stories viewing them negatively, and they were never covered in a positive 
tone in the studied sample (See Table 8, Figure 4). Differences between the sampled 
newspapers were not statistically significant, χ2 (3, N = 11) = 4.28, p = .23. Al-Ahram, 
Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ were all neutral in covering Salafi parties 
and movements other than the Salafi Call/Al-Noor, compared to Al-Dostor with half of 
its front-page news articles on them being negative (50%, n = 2), and the other half 
neutral. 
Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya or Al-Bena’ w Al-Tanmia party 
 Front-page news stories that referred to Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya or its political 
party Al-Bena‘ w Al-Tanmia were neutral (54.5%, n = 12) slightly more than negative 
(40.9%, n = 9). Of the total 22 (11.2%, N = 197) news stories that covered Al-Gama‘a 
Al-Islamiyya, only one viewed them positively (See Table 8, Figure 4). No statistically 
significant differences were found between the sampled newspapers in their tone towards 
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Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya or its political party, χ2 (6, N = 22) = 5.46, p = .49. But 75% of 
the news articles in Al-Masry Al-Youm approached Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya negatively 
(n = 3). Half of Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ articles was negative (50%, n = 3) and the other half 
was neutral. Al-Ahram was the opposite with most of its articles (80%, n = 4) neutral 
towards Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya, while Al-Dostor articles was primarily neutral (57.1%, 
n = 4) then negative (28.6%, n = 2). The only news story that represented Al-Gama‘a Al-
Islamiyya positively was also found in Al-Dostor.  
Abu Ismail supporters/Al-Raya Party 
 The dominant coverage tone towards the supporters of Hazem Abu Ismail 
supporters, the disqualified presidential candidate, or his Al-Raya Party, was negative. A 
total of 83.3% (n = 5) of the 6 front-page news articles that referred to them viewed them 
unfavorably (See Table 8, Figure 4). The only news story that viewed them neutrally was 
found in Al-Ahram, while a positive tone towards them was completely absent in all 
sampled articles. No statistically significant differences were found between the four 
newspaper in this regard, χ2 (3, N = 6) = 2.4, p = .49.  
Al-Wasat Party 
 Compared to other Islamists, Al-Wasat was covered differently. Unlike other 
Islamists, the party was not viewed unfavorably in any of the sampled news articles (See 
Table 8, Figure 4). Despite being only mentioned in 4% (n = 8) of the sampled news 
stories, coverage tone was more neutral (62.5%, n = 5) than positive (37.5%, n = 3). 
Statistically significant difference among studied papers were not found, χ2 (2, N = 8) = 
2.31, p = .32. Al-Dostor never mentioned Al-Wasat in its news article on Islamists, 
suggesting that it might have defined it as a non-Islamist party. Al-Ahram articles on Al-
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Wasat were all neutral (n = 2), while Al-Masry Al-Youm was more positive than neutral, 
but with slight differences (2 to 1 article). Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ covered Al-Wasat 
neutrally in 2 articles and positively in one article.  
 Only one article in Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ referred to Al-Haya al-Shariyya lil-Haquq 
wa-l Islah, and it was covered negatively. 
Islamists in general  
 A total of 31% (n = 61) of the sampled 197 front-page news stories referred to 
Islamists in general (including general reference to the Salafis without specifying a 
certain Salafi party or group). Among these news articles, Islamists in general were 
primarily covered in a negative tone (62.3%, n = 38) far more than being covered 
neutrally (36.1%, n = 22, See Table 8, Figure 4). Only one article referred to Islamists 
positively, and again it was in Al-Masry Al-Youm. The differences between the four 
sampled papers were not statistically significant, χ2 (6, N = 61) = 5.45, p = .49. Al-Dostor 
came first in covering Islamists negatively with 70.6% (n = 12) of its articles on them, 
closely followed by Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (69.6%, n = 16). Al-Masry Al-Youm articles 
were almost divided between negative and neutral coverage. Half of its front-page news 
articles covered them negatively (50%, n = 8) and 43.8% (n = 7) approached them 
neutrally. Al-Ahram was more neutral in covering Islamists with 60% (n = 3) of its front-
page news articles, while the rest of its articles (40%, n = 2) covered them negatively.  
  
89 
 
Table 8 
Frequency of coverage tone towards each of the cited Islamic group 
Islamic Group Negative Neutral Positive 
MB/FJP 87 64 5 
55.8% 41% 3.2% 
The Islamists or The 
Salafis 
38 22 1 
62.3% 36.1% 1.6% 
The Salafi Call/Al-Noor 13 27 0 
32.5% 67.5% 0 
Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya 9 12 1 
40.9% 54.5% 4.5% 
Other Salafi groups 2 9 0 
18.2% 81.8% 0 
Al-Wasat Party 0 5 3 
0 62.5% 37.5% 
Abu Ismail Supporters 5 1 0 
83.3% 16.7% 0 
Al-Haya al-Shariyya lil-
Haquq wa-l Islah 
1 0 0 
100% 0 0 
Figure 4 
Frequency of coverage tone towards each of the cited Islamic movements 
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Dominant frames in covering Islamists 
 Frames associated with negative implications were more dominant in covering 
Islamists, while more neutral frames were less observed (See Figure 5).  Islamic 
movements and parties were mainly framed through the ―anti-democracy‖ (23.4%, n = 
46), ―political organization‖ (13.2%, n = 26), ―violence‖ (11.2%, n = 22), ―polarization‖ 
(10.2%, n = 20), and ―anti-revolution‖ (9.6%, n = 19). Less frequently used were the 
―reconciliation‖ (7.6%, n = 15), ―hypocrisy‖ (7.1%, n= 14), ―anti-modernity‖ (6.1%, n = 
12), ―internal conflict‖ (5.6%, n = 11), ―conspiracy‖ (3.6%, n = 7), and ―victims of 
Mubarak and State Security‖ (2.5%, n = 5) frames. 
Figure 5 
Dominant frames used with Islamic movements 
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9). Al-Dostor and Al-Masry Al-Youm were the highest among the four newspapers to 
frame Islamists as ―anti-democracy‖. A total of 30.7% (n = 23) news articles in Al-Dostor 
and 24.4% (n = 11) in Al-Masry Al-Youm framed Islamists as such, followed by Al-
Ahram in 22.7% (n = 5) of its articles and finally came Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ with 12.7% 
(n = 7). Around fourth of Al-Ahram front-page news articles (27.3%, n = 6) framed 
Islamists as ―politically organized‖, followed by Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (16.4%, n = 9), then 
Al-Masry Al-Youm (11.1%, n = 5) and Al-Dostor (8%, n = 6). Al-Dostor was also more 
likely to frame Islamists as ―violent‖ in 16% (n =12) of its articles, followed by Al-Youm 
Al-Sabea‘ (9.1%, n = 5) then Al-Masry Al-Youm (8.9%, n = 4). Only one of Al-Ahram 
articles framed them as violent. The ―polarization‖ frame prevailed in Al-Ahram with 
27.3% (n = 6) of it articles. It was also used frequently in Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (16.4%, n 
= 9), but less used in Al-Masry Al-Youm (6.7%, n = 3) or Al-Dostor (2.7%, n = 2). After 
the ―anti-democracy‖ frame, Al-Masry Al-Youm was more likely to frame Islamists as 
―anti-revolution‖ in 15.6% (n = 7) of the articles, followed by Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ 
(10.9%, n = 6) then Al-Dostor (8%, n = 6).  
 The ―reconciliation‖ frame was less observed, with Al-Masry Al-Youm using it in 
11.1% (n = 5) of the articles, followed closely by Al-Ahram (9.1%, n = 2) and Al-Youm 
Al-Sabea‘ (7.3%, n = 4) then Al-Dostor (5.3%, n = 4). Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ was also 
more likely than the other newspapers to frame Islamists as ―anti-modernity‖ in 10.9% (n 
=6) of the articles, followed by Al-Masry Al-Youm (6.7%, n = 3) then Al-Dostor (4%, n 
= 3). Al-Ahram was the highest among the four studied papers to use the ―internal 
conflict‖ frame in 9.1% (n = 2) of its articles, followed by Al-Youm Al-Sabea (5.5%, n = 
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3) then Al-Dostor (5.3%, n = 4). Al-Dostor and Al- Masry Al-Youm framed Islamists as 
―hypocrites‖ in 12% (n = 9), and 8.9% (n = 4) of their articles respectively.  
Table 9 
Difference in framing Islamists among newspapers 
Frame Newspaper Total 
Al-Ahram 
 
(Least 
Violations) 
Al-Masry 
Al-Youm 
(Moderate 
Violations) 
Al-Youm 
Al-Sabea' 
(Minimum 
Violations) 
Al-Dostor 
 
(High 
Violations) 
Anti-democracy 
5 11 7 23 46 
22.7% 24.4% 12.7% 30.7% 23.4% 
Political organization 
6 5 9 6 26 
27.3% 11.1% 16.4% 8.0% 13.2% 
Violence 
1 4 5 12 22 
4.5% 8.9% 9.1% 16.0% 11.2% 
Polarization 
6 3 9 2 20 
27.3% 6.7% 16.4% 2.7% 10.2% 
Anti-revolution 
0 7 6 6 19 
0.0% 15.6% 10.9% 8.0% 9.6% 
Reconciliation 
2 5 4 4 15 
9.1% 11.1% 7.3% 5.3% 7.6% 
Hypocrisy 
0 4 1 9 14 
0.0% 8.9% 1.8% 12.0% 7.1% 
Anti-modernity/threat 
to Egyptian culture 
0 3 6 3 12 
0.0% 6.7% 10.9% 4.0% 6.1% 
Internal Conflict 
2 2 3 4 11 
9.1% 4.4% 5.5% 5.3% 5.6% 
Conspiracy/treason 
0 1 3 3 7 
0.0% 2.2% 5.5% 4.0% 3.6% 
Victims of Mubarak, 
and state security 
0 0 2 3 5 
0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 4.0% 2.5% 
Total 
22 45 55 75 197 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
χ2 (30, N = 197) = 46.4, p = .028 
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Framing the MB/FJP 
 Significant differences were found between the frames used when the Muslim 
Brotherhood or their Freedom and Justice Party was mentioned, χ2 (10, N = 197) = 27.84, 
p = .00 (See Table 10). Of the total (79.2%, n = 156) articles citing the MB/FJP, the 
dominant frames used were anti-democracy (26.3%, n = 41), political organization 
(14.1%, n = 22), anti-revolution (10.9%, n = 17), polarization (10.9%, n = 17), hypocrisy 
(8.3%, n = 13), violence (7.7%, n = 12), reconciliation (7.1%, n = 11), internal conflict 
(5.1%, n = 8), conspiracy/treason (4.5%, n = 7), and anti-modernity (3.8%, n = 6). 
Table 10 
Differences in frames used when the MB/FJP are mentioned   
Frame MB/FJP mentioned 
Yes No 
Anti-democracy 
41 5 
26.3% 12.2% 
Politically organized 
22 4 
14.1% 9.8% 
Polarization 
17 3 
10.9% 7.3% 
Anti-revolution 
17 2 
10.9% 4.9% 
Hypocrisy 
13 1 
8.3% 2.4% 
Violence 
12 10 
7.7% 24.4% 
Reconciliation 
11 4 
7.1% 9.8% 
Internal conflict 
8 3 
5.1% 7.3% 
Conspiracy/treason 
7 0 
4.5% 0.0% 
Anti-modernity/threat to Egyptian 
culture 
6 6 
3.8% 14.6% 
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Victims of Mubarak & state 
security 
2 3 
1.3% 7.3% 
Total 156 41 
χ2 (10, N = 197) = 27.84, p = .00 
 Chi square results didn‘t indicate a statistical significance difference between the 
studied newspapers in the frames used to cover the MB/FJP, χ2 (30, N = 156) = 42.6, p = 
.064. But some indicative differences existed. A total of 37.7% of Al-Dostor articles 
framed the MB as ―anti-democracy‖, followed by 23.1% (n = 9) in Al-Masry Al-Youm, 
20% (n = 4) in Al-Ahram, and 15.8% in Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘. Al-Ahram was more likely 
to frame the MB as ―politically organized‖ (30%, n = 6), far more than Al-Youm Al-
Sabea‘ (15.8%, n = 6), and Al-Masry Al-Youm (12.8%, n = 5). The same pattern 
appeared with the ―polarization‖ frame which used more in Al-Ahram (30%¸ n = 6), then 
Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (15.8%, n = 6). Al-Masry Al-Youm was more likely than the three 
other newspapers to view the MB as ―anti-revolution‖ in 17.9% of its articles (n = 7), 
followed by 10.5% in Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ and 10.2% in Al-Dostor. The latter was more 
likely than the other papers to frame the MB as hypocrites in 13.6% (n = 8) of the 
articles, followed by Al-Masry Al-Youm (10.3%, n = 4). Half of the articles framing the 
MB as violent were also found in Al-Dostor (10.2%, n = 6). 
Framing the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party 
 Significant differences were found in the frames employed when the Salafi Call 
and its Al-Noor party were mentioned, χ2 (10, N = 197) = 29.27, p = .00 (See Table 11). 
In the total 40 (20.3% N = 197) articles that mentioned the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party, 
they were predominantly framed through the more neutral ―politically organized‖ and 
―polarization‖ frames with 20% of the articles for each (n = 8), ―anti-democracy‖ and 
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―Internal conflict‖ with 17.5% of the articles for each (n = 7), the ―reconciliation‖ frame 
(10%, n = 4), and the ―anti-revolution‖ frame (5%, n = 2). Conspiracy frame was never 
used with the Salafi Call/Al-Noor. And only one article appeared for each of the 
following frames: violence, hypocrisy, victims of Mubarak regime, and anti-modernity 
frames. 
Table 11 
Difference in frames used with the Salafi Call/Al-Noor Party 
Frame The Salafi Call/Al-
Noor mentioned 
Yes No 
Politically organized 
8 18 
20.0% 11.5% 
Polarization 
8 12 
20.0% 7.6% 
Anti-democracy 
7 39 
17.5% 24.8% 
Internal conflict 
7 4 
17.5% 2.5% 
Reconciliation 
4 11 
10.0% 7.0% 
Anti-revolution 
2 17 
5.0% 10.8% 
Anti-modernity/threat to Egyptian 
culture 
1 11 
2.5% 7.0% 
Violence 
1 21 
2.5% 13.4% 
Hypocrisy 
1 13 
2.5% 8.3% 
Conspiracy 
0 7 
0.0% 4.5% 
Victims of Mubarak, & state 
security 
1 4 
2.5% 2.5% 
Total 40 157 
χ2 (10, N = 197) = 29.27, p = .00 
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 Differences between the four studied newspapers in the frames used to cover the 
Salafi Call or Al-Noor party were not statistically significant, χ2 (27, N = 40) = 35.82, p = 
.119. However, Al-Ahram was more likely to use the ―polarization‖ frame when citing 
the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party with 40% (n = 4) of the articles, followed by Al-Masry Al-
Youm (18.8%, n = 3). On the contrary, Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ was more likely to view the 
Salafi Call as ―politically organized‖ in 37.5% of its articles on them (n = 3), followed by 
Al-Dostor (33.3%, n = 2), then Al-Ahram (20%, n = 2). Al-Masry Al-Youm covered 
them as ―politically organized‖ in one article only. Al-Masry Al-Youm was the highest 
among the three newspapers in framing the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party as ―anti-
democracy‖ with 37.5% (n = 6) of the articles, twice as framing them through the 
―reconciliation‖ frame (18.8%, n = 3), while Al-Dostor was more likely to focus on the 
―internal conflict‖ when covering the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party (33.3%, n = 2).  
Dominant frames used with other Islamist movements and parties 
 Framing differed significantly when Salafi parties and movements other than the 
Salafi Call/Al-Noor party were mentioned, χ2 (10, N = 197) = 18.22, p = .05 (See Table 
14). Al-Asala, Al-Fadila, Al-Watan parties and the Salafi Front were more framed using 
the ―polarization‖ (36.4%, n = 4) and the ―reconciliation‖ (18.2%, n = 2) frames.  
 There were no statistically significant differences in using certain frames when 
Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya or its Al-Bena‘ w Al-Tanmia party was mentioned, χ2 (10, N = 
197) = 11.2, p = .34 (See Table 14). Polarization frame was more used when Al- Gama‘a 
Al-Islamiyya was mentioned with 27.3% (n = 6) of the articles, followed by the anti-
democracy frame in 18.2% (n = 4), then the anti-revolution and the violence frames with 
13.6% (n = 3) for each. 
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 No significant differences among frames were found when Al-Wasat was 
mentioned, χ2 (10, N = 197) = 14.65, p = .15 (See Table 14). Of the total 4.1% (n = 8) 
articles that mentioned them, they were viewed through a ―politically organized‖ frame in 
37.5% of the articles (n = 3), and ―internal conflict‖ frame in 25% of the articles (n = 2).  
 Statistically significant differences were found in frames used when Abu Ismail 
supporters or his Al-Raya Party were mentioned, χ2 (10, N = 197) = 18.14, p = .05 (See 
Table 14). In the 6 articles that mentioned them, two used the polarization frame (33.3%) 
and another two used the internal conflict frame (33.3%). 
Framing Islamists and the Salafis when mentioned in general 
 When the Islamists in general (including the Salafis in general) were mentioned, 
certain frames appeared more than others, and differences were statistically significant, 
χ2 (10, N = 197) = 23.12, p = .01 (See Table 14). Of the 61 (31%, N = 197) articles that 
referred to Islamists or the Salafis in general with or without specifying a certain Islamic 
movement, anti-democracy and polarization frames came first with 18% (n = 11) and 
16.4% (n = 10) respectively, followed by violence (14.8%, n = 9), anti-revolution (13.1%, 
n = 8), and anti-modernity frames (11.5%, n = 7). 
Frames and newspaper ownership type 
 There is a statistically significant differences between the sampled state-owned 
newspaper (Al-Ahram) and the private newspapers (Al-Masry Al-Youm, Al-Youm Al-
Sabea‘ and Al-Dostor) in the frames they employed when covering Islamists, χ2 (30, N = 
197) = 19.63, p = .03 (See Table 12). Both types of newspapers ownership used the anti-
democracy frame almost equally with 23.4% (n = 41) for the private outlets and 22.7% (n 
= 5) for the state-owned newspaper.  The state-owned newspaper was more likely to use 
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the ―politically organized‖ frame and the ―polarization‖ frame with 27.3% (n = 6) of its 
articles on Islamists for each. This was more than double the percentage found in private 
newspapers for the ―politically organized‖ frame (11.4%, n = 20), and the ―polarization‖ 
frame (8%, n = 14). On the contrary, private newspapers were far more likely to use the 
violence frame (12%, n = 21) compared to 4.5% (n = 1) in the state-owned outlet. Al-
Ahram used the ―internal conflict‖ frame (9.1%, n = 2) more than the private newspapers 
(5.1%, n = 9). The same with the ―reconciliation‖ frame with 9.1% (n = 2) in Al-Ahram 
compared to 7.4% (n = 13) in private newspapers.  
 Some frames were exclusively used by private newspapers and didn‘t appear in 
the state-owned outlet including the anti-revolution, conspiracy, anti-modernity, 
hypocrisy, and victims of Mubarak regime. 
Table 12 
Differences in frames according to newspaper ownership type 
Frame Ownership Type Total 
State Private 
Anti-democracy 
5 41 46 
22.7% 23.4% 23.4% 
Politically organized 
6 20 26 
27.3% 11.4% 13.2% 
Violence Frame 
1 21 22 
4.5% 12.0% 11.2% 
Polarization 
6 14 20 
27.3% 8.0% 10.2% 
Anti-revolution 
0 19 19 
0.0% 10.9% 9.6% 
Reconciliation 
2 13 15 
9.1% 7.4% 7.6% 
Hypocrisy 
0 14 14 
0.0% 8.0% 7.1% 
Anti-modernity 0 12 12 
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0.0% 6.9% 6.1% 
Internal conflict 
2 9 11 
9.1% 5.1% 5.6% 
Conspiracy 
0 7 7 
0.0% 4.0% 3.6% 
Victims of Mubarak & 
state security 
0 5 5 
0.0% 2.9% 2.5% 
Total 
22 175 197 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
χ2 (30, N = 197) = 19.63, p = .03 
 
Frames and level of media professionalism 
 The sampled newspapers varied in their level in professional and ethical practices 
as classified by the Supreme Press Council in Egypt (Hamada, Al-Ghaly, Al-Azrak, & 
Fikry, 2013). Significant differences were found between the newspapers classified 
according to their level of commitment to journalism standards in the frames they used 
when covering Islamists, χ2 (30, N = 197) = 46.4, p = .028 (See Table 9, Figure 6). The 
more the newspaper is committed to ethical and professional standards, the more it is 
likely to use analytical frames in its coverage of Islamists. The frames most used with 
Islamists in the newspaper of the least violations (Al-Ahram) were ―polarization‖ and 
―political organization‖ equally with 27.3% (n = 6) article for each, followed by the ―anti-
democracy‖ frame (22.7%, n = 5). The same was with the next category which showed 
slightly more violations of press standards but remains in the less violators (Al-Youm Al-
Sabea‘) which framed Islamists mainly through a ―polarization‖ and ―political 
organization‖ frames with 16.4% of articles for each (n = 9) slightly more than the ―anti-
democracy‖ frame 12.7% (n = 7). Negative frames were more dominant than analytical 
frames in the newspaper of moderate violations (Al-Masry Al-Youm) including ―anti-
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democracy‖ 24.4% (n = 11), ―anti-revolution‖ (15.6%, n = 7), then ―political 
organization‖ and ―reconciliation‖ in 11.1% or 5 article for each. The highest newspaper 
in violating professional and ethical standards (Al-Dostor) was far more likely to use 
negative frames in covering Islamists than the three other papers with the ―anti-
democracy‖ frame in 30.7% (n = 23) of its articles, followed by the ―violence‖ frame in 
16% (n = 12), and ―hypocrisy‖ frame in 12% (n = 9).  
Figure 6 
Framing by newspaper level of professionalism 
 
 
Dominant frames and roles of Islamists 
 The time frame of the study was categorized into four periods of significant 
change in the roles played by Islamic movements and parties in political life. The first 
period is between the March 2011 constitutional referendums, seen by many as the 
beginning of the rift between Islamists and seculars, and until before the parliamentary 
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elections (from February 12 – November 27, 2011). Islamists acted as opposition to the 
SCAF that was ruling the country during that period. The second period includes the 
parliamentary elections in which Islamists won a majority, and lasts until the beginning 
of the presidential elections (from November 28, 2011 – May 22, 2012). The third period 
consists of the six first months in President Morsi tenure where Islamists reached 
executive power for the first time, and end before he issued the Constitutional 
Declaration (from May 23 – November 22, 2012). The last period extends from the 
Constitutional Declaration which consolidated the President‘s power until the second 
anniversary of January 25
th
 revolution which mark the end of the study‘s time frame 
(from November 22, 2012 to February 12, 2013), this period also include the referendum 
on and approval of the constitution.  
 Frames used by Egyptian newspapers differed significantly between the four 
specified periods, χ2 (30, N = 197) = 76.35, p = .00 (See Table 13, Figure 7). Before 
Islamists had a majority in parliament, they were largely framed as politically organized 
(20.4%, n = 10), violent (16.3%, n = 8), anti-modernity (16.3%, n = 8) and anti-
democracy (12.2%, n = 6). After they gained a majority in parliament and in addition to 
the political organization frame, two other frames appeared powerfully: the anti-
revolution (15%, n = 9) and the reconciliation (16.7%, n = 10). After the election of 
President Morsi and dissolving of the People‘s Assembly (lower house of parliament), the 
anti-democracy frame was the most used (41.5%, n = 22), followed by other negative 
frames including hypocrisy (13.2%, n = 7) and violence (11.3%, n = 6). This continued 
after President Morsi issued the Constitutional Declaration on November 22, 2012. From 
this date until the second anniversary of the revolution, the prevailing frame was anti-
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democracy (40%, n = 14), other frames like violence, anti-revolution and polarization 
also appeared frequently but far less than anti-democracy with 14.3% (n = 5) of the 
articles for each. 
Table 13 
Differences in frames according to change in political role of Islamists 
Frame Periods Total 
 
Before 
Parliamentary 
elections 
From 
Parliamentary 
till before 
Presidential 
elections 
From 
Presidential 
elections till 
before 
Constitutional 
Declaration 
After 
Constitutional 
Declaration 
till Feb 11, 
2013 
 
Anti-
democracy 
6 4 22 14 46 
12.2% 6.7% 41.5% 40.0% 23.4% 
Politically 
organized 
10 12 4 0 26 
20.4% 20.0% 7.5% 0.0% 13.2% 
Violence 
8 3 6 5 22 
16.3% 5.0% 11.3% 14.3% 11.2% 
Polarization 
4 6 5 5 20 
8.2% 10.0% 9.4% 14.3% 10.2% 
Anti-
revolution 
4 9 1 5 19 
8.2% 15.0% 1.9% 14.3% 9.6% 
Reconciliation 
1 10 2 2 15 
2.0% 16.7% 3.8% 5.7% 7.6% 
Hypocrisy 
1 4 7 2 14 
2.0% 6.7% 13.2% 5.7% 7.1% 
Anti-
modernity 
8 2 1 1 12 
16.3% 3.3% 1.9% 2.9% 6.1% 
Internal 
conflict 
3 4 3 1 11 
6.1% 6.7% 5.7% 2.9% 5.6% 
Conspiracy/tre
ason 
3 2 2 0 7 
6.1% 3.3% 3.8% 0.0% 3.6% 
Victims of 
Mubarak 
1 4 0 0 5 
2.0% 6.7% 0.0% 0.0% 2.5% 
Total 49 60 53 35 197 
χ2 (30, N = 197) = 76.35, p = .00 
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Figure 7 
Framing through time for the top five frames 
 
Difference in framing different Islamic movements 
 The Muslim Brotherhood and their Freedom and Justice Party were framed 
different than the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party (See Table 14, Figure 8).  The MB/FJP were 
far more framed as anti-democracy (26.3%, n = 41) than the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party 
(17.5%, n = 7). Also as anti-revolution almost twice as the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party, 
with 10.9% (n = 17) for MB compared to 5% for the Salafi Call/Al-Noor Party (n = 2). 
On the contrary, the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party was more framed through the political 
organization and polarization frames in 20% of the articles (n = 8) for each, compared to 
14.1% (n = 22) and 10.9% (n = 17) respectively for the MB. The Salafi Call/Al-Noor 
party were also more framed using the internal conflict frame with 17.5% of the articles 
(n = 7) compared to 5.1% (n = 8) in the case of the MB. The reconciliation frame was 
Anti-democracy
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also more used with the Salafi Call/Al-Noor (10%, n = 4) compared to (7.1%, n = 11) for 
the MB. 
 Conspiracy frame was never used with the Salafi Call/Al-Noor while used in 
4.5% (n = 7) of articles on MB. Only one article used each of the following frames for the 
Salafi Call/Al-Noor: violence, hypocrisy, victims of Mubarak regime, and anti-modernity 
frames, far less than the MB which was frequently represented using the frames of 
hypocrisy (8.3%, n = 13), and violence (7.7%, n = 12). 
Table 14 
Frequency of frames used with each Islamist group 
Frame Islamic Movement or Party 
MB/FJP Islamists 
or Salafis 
in general 
Al-Noor Al-Gama‘a 
Al-
Islamiyya 
Other 
Salafi 
Groups 
Al-Wasat 
Anti-democracy 
41 11 7 4 1 0 
26.3% 18% 17.5% 18.2% 9.1% 0 
Political 
organization 
22 3 8 2 0 3 
14.1% 4.9% 20.0% 9.1% 0 37.5% 
Violence 
12 9 1 3 0 0 
7.7% 14.8% 2.5% 13.5% 0 0 
Polarization 
17 10 8 6 4 1 
10.9% 16.4% 20.0% 27.3% 36.4% 12.5% 
Anti-revolution 
17 8 2 3 1 1 
10.9% 13.1% 5.0% 13.6% 9.1% 12.5% 
Reconciliation 
11 6 4 1 2 0 
7.1% 9.8% 10.0% 4.5% 18.2% 0 
Hypocrisy 
13 2 1 0 0 0 
8.3% 3.3% 2.5% 0 0 0 
Anti-modernity 
6 7 1 1 0 1 
3.8% 11.5% 2.5% 4.5% 0 12.5% 
Internal conflict 
8 1 7 1 1 2 
5.1% 1.6% 17.5 4.5% 9.1% 25% 
Conspiracy/trea 7 1 0 1 1 0 
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son 4.5% 1.6% 0% 4.5% 9.1% 0 
Victims of 
Mubarak, and 
state security 
2 3 1 0 1 0 
1.3% 4.9% 2.5% 0 9.1% 0 
Total 156 61 40 22 11 8 
Figure 8 
Framing differences between the MB and Al-Noor 
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VI. DISCUSSION 
 This study examined the content of four Egyptian daily newspapers to find out 
how they framed Islamic movements in the two years following the January 25
th
 
revolution,   and if framing differed across newspapers ownership types, degrees of media 
professionalism, time periods of change in Islamists political role, or across Islamic 
groups. This chapter summarizes the main findings of the study, and compares them to 
previous research. 
 The three top topics in which Islamists were more covered included a level of 
conflict or competition; protests, elections and referendums, and violence. The sampled 
private Egyptian newspapers used personal photos in more than half of the articles on 
Islamists, suggesting a possible personalization of issues/events. The state-owned Al-
Ahram was the only exception where photos of protests were published with articles on 
Islamist more than three other papers. 
 Not surprisingly, the Muslim Brotherhood and their Freedom and Justice Party 
were the most mentioned Islamic group, since they won in all elections and referendums 
held after the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ tended to mention 
Islamists in general or the Salafis in general without specifying which party or movement 
they are referring to. This leads to generalization to all Islamists without taking into 
account the variety and even the discrepancy among their positions. 
 One of the most significant devices in framing was the labels used to refer to 
Islamists.  Although all four newspapers referred to Islamists mainly with their official 
names (65.5%), general reference to ―the Islamists‖ and the ―Salafis‖ appeared in almost 
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fifth of the sample. Al-Ahram was more likely to use the official name while Al-Youm 
Al-Sabae‘ came first in using ―the Salafis‖ and Al-Masry Al-Youm came first in using 
―the Islamists‖. Al-Dostor was far more likely than the other papers to use labels 
implying negative impressions especially the anti-democracy theme. 
 The sampled private newspapers tended to use vague terms when referring to 
opponents of Islamists. Only 41% of the total sample defined them with their official 
political name or affiliation, and most of these were in the state-owned Al-Ahram.  
 Moreover, the three private newspapers were more likely to use generalized labels 
that are plausible or neutral when referring to opponent of Islamists, while labels with 
negative implications were nearly absent. Among the favorable labels, opponents of 
Islamists were referred to as ―revolutionary groups, and youth movements‖, ―civil 
forces‖, and ―national forces‖ in around fifth of the sample combined (18.4%), slightly 
more than neutral labels like ―political forces‖, and ―protesters‖ (12.4%).  Political 
orientation of Islamists‘ opponents (the one that is strongly emphasized when referring to 
Islamists) was only mentioned in two of Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ articles (1.5%) where they 
were referred to as Leftists or Liberals. In addition, the state-owned Al-Ahram had fifth 
of its articles referring to Islamists‘ rivals using the general term of ―political forces‖. 
This tendency imply that the variety of political forces in the Egyptian society oppose 
Islamists, which may have helped increase the perceived polarization. 
 Furthermore, religious identities or orientations like Coptic and Sufi were 
sometimes emphasized when speaking of Islamists‘ rivals especially in Al-Youm Al-
Sabea‘. The same with broad professional categories like experts, lawyers and workers in 
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the case of Al-Dostor which used them to introduce anti-Islamists while disregarding 
their political orientations. This may have further fueled polarization by adding sectarian 
and societal dimensions to the political divide.  
 The private newspapers, especially Al-Dostor and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘, and to a 
less extent Al-Masry Al-Youm, emphasized the Islamist political orientation whenever an 
Islamist is mentioned even if he/she is approached as a professional or an expert. But they 
mostly refrained from treating opponents of Islamists in the same way. While frequently 
referring to Islamists as ―the Islamic forces‖ and ―the Salafis‖ or as ―the Salafi‖ Al-Noor 
Party or ―the MB-affiliated‖ Lawyer (Ikhwany), no such stress was found when 
opponents of Islamists were mentioned; there were no ―the Secular forces‖, ―the Secular‖ 
Free Egyptians party, or ―the Socialist‖ lawyer. This distinctive discourse draws a picture 
of reality on which Islamists are excluded from the mainstream society. 
 On the contrary, when approaching Islamists professionally in the state-owned Al-
Ahram they were more likely referred to with their official professional titles like the 
President, the governor and so on. This might be the reason behind the small percentage 
of Al-Ahram articles that fell under the study sample.  
 With the exception of Al-Dostor, the sampled Egyptian newspapers quoted both 
Islamist and anti-Islamist sources in stories on Islamists with the former slightly more 
than the latter. Providing the two opposite views could be regarded as an attempt to 
achieve objectivity. But for Al-Dostor, Islamist sources were overshadowed. Al-Dostor 
cited anti-Islamist sources far more than the originally-covered Islamists (52% to 32%). 
In all four newspapers neutral sources were the least cited, but Al-Masry Al-Youm was 
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far more likely than other papers in quoting or paraphrasing neutral sources adding more 
variety to its coverage. Al-Ahram and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ seems to have reduced views 
on Islamists to pro and anti-camps, voices in the middle ground that didn‘t fit in the 
classification were ignored, further magnifying polarization. 
 Overall, the most negatively covered Islamic movements were Abu Ismail 
supporters, Islamic movements in general (when they were mentioned without 
specifications), and the Muslim Brotherhood or its Freedom and Justice party.  
 The MB/FJP was covered negatively in more than half of the articles (55.8%), the 
rest were neutral with only 3% viewing them positively. Certain newspapers had clear 
directions toward the MB/FJP, which was primarily negative in Al-Dostor, and neutral in 
Al-Ahram. The mostly neutral coverage tone in Al-Ahram might be a result of the 
appointment of an Information Minister from the Brotherhood during Morsi‘s term in 
office which may have influenced Al-Ahram to be less negative in its coverage of them, 
although some observers highlighted that state media didn‘t act as mouthpieces of 
government under Morsi the same way they did with his predecessors (Kirkpatrick & El-
Sheikh, 2012; AP, July 12, 2013).  In the case of Al-Masry Al-Youm and despite that the 
dominant direction in covering the MB was negative; it presented them positively in three 
of its articles. This trend was also observed when covering some other Islamic 
movements, suggesting that Al-Masry Al-Youm tries sometimes to provide exceptions to 
its dominant coverage tone. 
 Surprisingly, the Salafi Call and its Al-Noor Party, the second major Islamic force 
in Egypt after the Brotherhood according to elections results, was covered neutrally in 
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almost two thirds of the sample, although this group is frequently seen as ‗ultra-
conservative‘ when compared to the Brotherhood. This disparity in coverage might be 
interpreted as a result  of the difference in political positions between the two parties 
especially right before President Morsi was deposed, but the study time frame ended up at 
the beginning of February 2013, a time were Al-Noor was a strong supportive of the 
Brotherhood positions and was still present in the presidential team. This result needs 
further investigation to find the reasons behind the disparity. But it is also worth 
mentioning that the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party was never covered positively. 
 Dominant coverage tone varied also between other Islamic groups. While 
Islamists in general or Abu Ismail supporters were covered negatively more than 
neutrally, minor Salafi parties and Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya were covered neutrally more 
than negatively. Al-Wasat was different, covered mostly neutral then positive. 
 Results suggest that when the general Islamism of political players was 
emphasized, they tend to be covered more negatively than neutrally. This might end up 
associating the political orientation of Islamists with negative impressions. This is similar 
-- to an extent -- to the practices of Western media when covering Muslims as indicated 
in previous research. They tended to emphasize the religious identity of Muslims 
whenever they are linked with negative actions like violence.  
 Frames associated with negative implications were more dominant in covering 
Islamists in the four sampled newspapers, while analytical frames which can be of 
neutral, positive or negative judgments were less observed. Islamic movements and 
parties were mainly framed using the ―anti-democracy‖, ―political organization‖, 
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―violence‖, ―polarization‖, and ―anti-revolution‖ frames which constitute together 67.6% 
of the sample. The political organization was the only neutral frame that appeared in the 
top five frames used with Islamists.  
 Islamists were framed as ―anti-democracy‖ in around fourth of the sample 
(23.4%) emphasizing that they seek to grab authority, consolidate their power, exclude 
and oppress others including other political forces, the judiciary, and the people. 
Brotherhoodization of the state theme was included under this frame. Islamists were also 
frequently framed as ―violent‖ (11.2%) threatening people and engaging in clashes, as 
―anti-revolution‖ (9.6%) who sabotaged the January 25th revolution, allied with its 
opponents, deceived revolutionaries, and wasted the revolution‘s gains, as ―hypocrites‖ 
(7.1%) deceiving people with religious symbols while being morally corrupt, and as 
―anti-modernity‖ (6.1%) in their thinking and lifestyle, opposing arts and literature and 
threatening Egypt‘s identity and national unity. They were also framed, but less 
frequently as engaged in ―internal conflict‖ either within their parties and movements or 
with fellow Islamists (5.6%), and as ―conspirators‖ (3.6%) cooperating with outside 
parties against Egypt‘s interests.  
 Analytical frames were less likely to be used, such as ―politically organized‖ 
which highlighted Islamists‘ organizational capabilities and political outreach (13.2%). 
The ―polarization‖ frame (10.2%) viewed political events as rounds of conflict between 
Islamists and the rest of the political forces, and sometimes  the society, referring to two 
sides (pro and anti) and emphasizing winners and losers. It treated each camp as a 
hegemonic group overlooking differences, focusing on extreme opinions and 
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overshadowing voices in the middle. An opposite ―reconciliation‖ frame that implied 
multiple sides and asserted co-operation, compromise and unity on national issues was 
used in 7.6% of the articles. Islamists were rarely framed as victims of Mubarak regime 
and its state security apparatus. 
 A significant difference was found between newspaper ownership types and the 
frames used in covering Islamists. The state-owned newspaper used analytical frames 
more than private newspapers. The ―political organization‖, ―polarization‖ and ―internal 
conflict‖ frames appeared in the state-owned Al-Ahram almost double the percentage in 
private newspapers for the same frames. On the contrary, private newspapers were far 
more likely to use the violence frame. Some frames were exclusively used by private 
newspapers including the anti-revolution, conspiracy, anti-modernity, and hypocrisy. But 
both types of newspapers ownership employed the anti-democracy frame similarly. 
 Frames that strongly feature anti-Islamist discourse were significantly used by 
newspapers that scored lower in professional and ethical standards scale as categorized by 
the Supreme Press Council in Egypt (Hamada, Al-Ghaly, Al-Azrak, & Fikry, 2013). The 
newspapers with the least violations, Al-Ahram, used frames that are more analytical than 
judgmental. The newspaper with minimum violations, Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ used both 
types but frames carrying a negative judgment were more used. The newspaper classified 
as moderate in its violations, Al-Masry Al-Youm, used the anti-democracy and anti-
revolution frames double the times it used analytical frames like the political organization 
or reconciliation. The highest newspaper in violating professional and ethical standards, 
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Al-Dostor, employed anti-Islamists frames far more than other newspapers especially the 
anti-democracy, violence and hypocrisy frames. 
 Different Islamic groups were framed differently. While the MB/FJP was 
primarily framed as anti-democracy, politically organized and anti-revolution, the Salafi 
Call/Al-Noor was more framed through the analytical frames of political organization, 
polarization, reconciliation and internal conflict. The MB/FJP was far more framed as 
anti-democracy and anti-revolution than the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party. The latter result is 
problematic since the Brotherhood participated in the January 25
th
 revolution while the 
Salafi Call‘s prominent leader Sheikh Yasser Borhami issued a fatwa at that time 
prohibiting participation in demonstrations. Conspiracy frame was never used with the 
Salafi Call/Al-Noor while used in 4.5% of the articles on MB. Also hypocrisy and 
violence were used with MB more than the Salafi Call/Al-Noor. 
 Results align with previous studies that found that frames develop with events. 
When the political roles of Islamists changed, framing became more negative in tone and 
increased in volume. As opposition, Islamists were framed as politically organized, 
violent, and anti-modernity. After gaining parliamentary majority, two other frames 
appeared powerfully: reconciliation and anti-revolution. After winning the Presidency, 
anti-democracy was the most salient frame, in addition to hypocrisy and violence. 
President Morsi‘s constitutional decree, regarded by anti-Islamists as the main reason for 
opposing him, was not a significant point of change in framing Islamic movements. 
Dominant frames remained the same: anti-democracy, violence, anti-revolution and 
polarization, but only increased in volume. 
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 The results of the study are consistent with the findings of prior scholarship that 
analyzed media representation of Islamists which found strong similarities between the 
ways in which media in Muslim countries framed Islamists and Western media 
representation of Muslims. The prevailing frames in Western media coverage of Muslims 
included terrorism/violence, anti-modernity, anti-democracy, and victimization of 
Muslim women. Western media also ignored diversity among Muslims or used a 
dichotomous two-sided internal conflict frame. These were the same in Egyptian cinema 
representation of Islamists, which also framed them as corrupt and hypocritical, as 
victims of authorities, and conspirators. In both cases, the Orientalist discourse was used 
to frame Muslims or Islamists as the ―Other‖. The dominant frames revealed in this study 
are similar except for the victimization of women, implying – at least to some extent -- 
the same exclusionary Orientalist view towards Islamists. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter includes the conclusions of the study, its limitations, ideas for future 
research, and recommendations for fair representation. 
 The study reached four main conclusions. First, that there is a framing bias against 
Islamists in Egyptian newspapers coverage. Anti-Islamists frames dominated most of 
Egyptian newspaper coverage of Islamists, while counter frames representing Islamists 
views -- such as being pro-revolution – were largely excluded from the debate.  
 Part of the negative framing of Islamists can be attributed to the fact that they 
were in power – and thus subject to more scrutiny – and also because they committed 
what was perceived a political mistakes during the transition period. However, the fact 
that framing was overwhelmingly negative in tone, consistent through time – and differed 
to some extent by newspaper type – suggests that it was, to a significant extent, 
ideologically driven. The coverage must also be seen in the light of what some scholars 
and analysts have characterized as a campaign to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood, 
particularly after the start of Mohamed Morsi‘s term in office (Esposito, 2013; Elmasry, 
2013; Howaidy, 2013a, Al-Majid, 2012). The drivers of the campaign were often 
opposition figures frequently sourced in news articles, and sometimes media figures 
themselves (Elmasry, 2013). 
 The second conclusion is that framing devices employed by Egyptian newspapers 
in covering Islamic groups reveal that framing may have contributed to the polarization 
of the Egyptian society. By using general labels that carry a value-judgment when 
referring to Islamists and their opponents, a distorted simplified picture of Islamists vs. 
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the rest of the political forces or the whole society is perceived. But the Egyptian reality 
is far complex. Most of the general labels used, like political forces or revolutionaries for 
example, included on the ground Islamic, anti-Islamic and also non-Islamic attitudes in 
the same label. 
 The third conclusion stems from the similarities between the results and the 
previously documented anti-Islamists frames in Egyptian media produced under Mubarak 
regime. This suggests that one of the main influences on Egyptian newspaper framing of 
Islamists in post-revolution Egypt is still Mubarak regime‘s framing of them. Further 
pointing out that Mubarak regime could still be the one who is reaching out to the media, 
and thus to more political power (Entman, 2007) Further research using more in-depth 
methods such as discourse analysis should clearly investigate such observation. 
 Fourth, the similarities between framing Islamists in Egyptian newspapers and 
framing Muslims in Western media as highlighted by previous research also suggest a 
similar potential framing effect. In Western contexts, Islamophobia was found to be the 
main consequence, as exemplified in three main effects: more hostility and fear of the 
excluded group, more public support to government actions against the excluded group, 
and increasing feelings among the excluded group of exclusion and discrimination. Due 
to the resemblance in framing, similar effects might be witnessed whether on policy, 
public attitudes, or Islamists themselves, suggesting an Islamistophobia in this case. But 
this an issue that would need further research by scholars. 
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Limitations    
 The results of this study are limited to the type of content analyzed, the 
newspapers sampled and the time period specified. Results are not generalizable beyond 
these boundaries. The study analyzed news articles only, and since some previous studies 
highlighted differences between news and commentary in the frames they propagated, 
results cannot be generalized to opinion content. It is also limited to the time period that 
ended on February 2013. After the July 3, 2013 media landscape and discourse changed 
dramatically. The study is also limited to describing the content of newspapers; any 
arguments on the effects of such content need further examination by other relevant 
research methods.  
Future Research 
 Future research should address how the framing of Islamic movements changed 
after the deposition of President Morsi in July 3, 2013. This is important in light of the 
several violations and attacks on press freedoms that took place afterwards, and the 
observed surge in anti-Islamist discourse that dominated the Egyptian media, painting 
Islamic movements as terrorists and attempting to justify the crackdown on them 
(Nordland, 2013) .  
 It is also important to compare framing of Egyptian Islamic movements between 
Egyptian and international media, especially after the increasing criticism from the 
military-backed government and some analysts (see Fishere, 2013) of the ‗biased‘ 
international media coverage of ongoing events in Egypt. It might also be useful to 
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compare newspapers framing with the framing of other media types like TV, since some 
studies have pointed out to some framing variations between different media types. 
 Further research should clearly find out why journalists frame Islamic movements 
in this way by utilizing the appropriate qualitative methods along with surveys and 
experiments. Based on Entman model (2007), reasons for bias might include perceived 
facts, events‘ context, public relations skills of supporters and opponents of an issue, 
unintended decision biases arising from market competition or the evaluation of the 
political game, or intended decision biases influenced by personal ideology. The 
consequences of bias might be fatal for society. Thus, accurately identifying reasons for 
framing bias enables the media to realize and perhaps reduce it, and audience members to 
become more aware of it. 
 Another area which needs further research is the effects of such negative framing. 
Framing effects are not inevitable, but are the results of the interaction between audience 
frames and media frames. Studies need to find out how the Egyptian audience perceives 
Islamic movements, and what relation this might have with the media framing of them.  
 Recommendations  
 If objectivity is to provide opposite positions within the same frame, fairness is to 
allow competing frames to appear equally over periods of time, or to employ judgment-
free frames. As indicated by previous studies, the perceived dominance and the potential 
effects of frames increase when they are not challenged and, thus they become 
standardized. Academics and media regulators should find effective ways to encourage 
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and guarantee fairness in media framing of different political actors, as one of the means 
to achieve reconciliation. Suggested ideas may include: 
 The incorporation of news ombudsmen in Egyptian newspapers 
 Increasing the scale and the effectiveness of public monitoring on the media.  
 Providing incentives -- like awards and tax relief -- to journalists and newspapers 
that are more committed to diversity in their framing. 
 Providing transparency of private newspapers ownership so that audience 
members become aware of the political orientation that might affect the editorial 
policy. 
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APPENDIX A: CONTENT ANALYSIS CODING SCHEME 
(Adapted from Entman, 2006; Entman, 2010; Elmasry, 2011; Ibrahim, 2012; Allagui & 
Najjar, 2011; Mishra, 2008; Khan & Govindasamy, 2011; Kerr & Moy, 2002) 
 
 Analyze first page articles which refer to Islamists in general, MB/FJP, Al-Nour/the 
Salafi Call, in the headline, sub-headlines, the three first paragraphs, the photo or the 
photo caption  
 Analyze articles referring to Morsi or the government only if correlated with any 
reference to Islamists 
 In case of Al-Dostor take the first page (not the cover) but the 3rd page in counting. 
 
 Article ID#: (number your articles)  
 
1. Article Date: (day/month/year) 
Year one: Feb 12, 2011 – Feb, 12, 2012 
1. Thursday, 31 March 2011 
2. Friday, 1 April 2011 
3. Wednesday, 13 April 2011 
4. Tuesday, 19 April 2011 
5. Wednesday, 18 May 2011 
6. Tuesday, 14 June 2011 
7. Thursday, 30 June 2011 
8. Monday, 4 July 2011 
9. Sunday, 9 October 2011 
10. Sunday, 30 October 2011 
11. Monday, 12 September 2011 
12. Friday, 23 December 2011 
13. Saturday, 7 January 2012 
14. Saturday, 28 January 2012 
Year two Feb, 12, 2012 – Feb 12, 2013 
15. Saturday, 25 February 2012 
16. Wednesday, 11 April 2012 
17. Friday, 4 May 2012 
18. Friday, 22 June 2012 
19. Monday, 2 July 2012 
20. Saturday, 28 July 2012 
21. Tuesday, 28 August 2012 
22. Thursday, 4 October 2012 
23. Sunday, 4 November 2012 
24. Thursday, 15 November 2012 
25. Tuesday, 27 November 2012 
26. Wednesday, 28 November 2012 
27. Sunday, 27 January 2013 
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28. Monday, 4 February 2013 
 
2. Newspaper: 
1. Al-Ahram 
2. Al-Masry Al-Youm 
3. Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ 
4. Al-Dostor 
 
3. Topic (decide from the headline, sub-head and the lead) 
1. Presidency decisions/declarations/actions 
2. Government decisions/actions 
3. Elections /Referendums/polls 
4. Constitution, constituent assembly 
5. Legislative bodies (People‘s assembly, Shura Council) 
6. Protests, sit-ins, strikes, and civil obedience 
7. Law/Judicial Bodies (anything involving judiciary bodies, legal 
regulations and restrictions, law enforcement) 
8. Violence (from: police, military, protestors, sectarian violence)  
9. Crime (investigations, lawsuits, trials, corruption, doesn‘t include 
terrorism) 
10. Human rights abuse (Military trials, torture) 
11. Economy/Business 
12. Religious affairs (statements of religious figures, religious trends and 
ideas) 
13. Corruption 
14. Culture 
15. Foreign relations (statements of foreign officials, US aid, peace treaty) 
16. Political meetings, press conferences (excluding those with the president, 
the government) 
17. Political parties formation, alliances, internal divisions 
18. Politicians statements, activities, tweets 
19. Terrorism in Sinai 
 
4. Is the Muslim Brotherhood or its FJP mentioned in the news story? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
5. Is the Salafi Call or its Al-Nour party mentioned in the news story? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
6. Are Al-Asala, Al-Fadila, and Al-Watan or the Salafi Front mentioned in the 
news story? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
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7. Is Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya or its Al-Binaa w Al-Tanmia party mentioned in the 
news story? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
8. Is Abu Ismail supporters, his Al-Raya Party or Al-Ummah Coalition mentioned 
in the news story? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
9. Is Al-Wasat Party mentioned in the news story? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
10. Is Al-Haya al-Shariyya lil-Haquq wa-l Islah (Islamic Legitimate Body of Rights 
and Reformation) mentioned in the news story? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
11. Are Islamists or the Salafis in general (as a plural with no specifications) 
mentioned in the news story (count it here if mentioned solely or with any of the 
above names)? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
12. What is the content of the photo accompanying the news story (If there is more 
than one photo, select the largest, if they are the same size, select the right/top 
one)? 
1. Personal 
2. Political meetings, press conferences (excluding those with the 
government, president) 
3. Protest, sit-ins, and funerals of martyrs 
4. Sit-in, strike 
5. Violence (from police/military, from protestors) 
6. Legislative bodies (People‘s assembly, Shura Council) 
7. Government/president meeting/speeches 
8. Logos/sings only 
9. No photo 
10. Elections or referendums 
11. Army vehicles, or soldiers 
12. Tunnel 
13. Previous issues of the newspaper 
14. Mosques, rituals and shrines 
15. Court  
16. Cleaning campaigns 
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17. Graph 
 
13. How does the news story refer to Islamists (in case of more than one lablel, take 
the one that occurred first in the head, sub-head, lead)? 
1. Islamists, Islamic Trends/forces/organization/movements/groups, 
Religious Trends/forces 
2. Militia/s, Militants, Terrorist/s, Islamic Thugs 
3. Cell/s, Network/s 
4. With their official name: e.g. The Salafi Call, The MB 
5. MB youth/Salafi Youth 
6. Bearded men, facially veiled women 
7. The Outlawed, the ex-terrorists 
8. Sheiks 
9. The Hired 
10. Other: please specify …. 
 
14. How does the news story refer to Islamists’ opponents (if it did)? 
1. Civil Trends, forces 
2. Revolutionary groups/forces, Youth, Youth movements 
3. The People, Citizen/Citizens, popular committees, residents 
4. Political forces, the parties, politicians, or activists 
5. National forces , patriotic forces 
6. Not mentioned 
7. With their official names 
8. Protestors 
9. Workers 
10. Other: please specify …. 
 
15. Are Islamist sources quoted or paraphrased? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
16. Are non-Islamist neutral sources quoted or paraphrased? (Include government 
officials here if they are technocrats not politicians, citizens, and eyewitnesses. If 
a source is not clearly anti-Islamists or Islamist, put him here. Put presidency 
here if referred to generally, and Morsi if not called (MB’s Morsi or something 
similar) 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
17. Are anti-Islamist sources quoted or paraphrased? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
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18. What is the news story direction towards Islamists mentioned in it (your first 
impression basically from head, sub-head, lead..)? 
Subject Positive 1 Neutral 2 Negative 3 Not 
mentioned 4 
19. MB/FJP     
19. The Salafi  Call/Al-Nour     
20. Al-Asala, Al-Fadila, Al-
Watan Parties, or the Salafi 
Front 
    
21. Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya 
or Al-Bena‘ w Al-Tanmia 
    
22. Abu Ismail supporters/Al-
Raya Party 
    
23. Al-Wasat     
24. Al-Haya al-Shariyya lil-
Haquq wa-l Islah 
    
25. Islamists or Salafis in 
general (as a plural with no 
specifications) 
    
 
26. What is the news story dominant frame of Islamists? (the one that is heavily 
supported through the most salient elements - head, sub-heads, lead, photo, pull 
quotes - and more likely to occur in readers minds. Below each frame is the main 
points that should be emphasized in it) 
 
1. Violence Frame: 
- Expressing anger and promising revenge. 
- Killing and injuring  
- Engaging in clashes 
- Destruction, burning and damage 
- Angry hostile slogans 
- Threatening people 
- Using war terminology  
- Defend terrorists 
 
2. Anti-revolution, the antagonist 
- Sabotaged the revolution  
- Had secret deals with Mubarak regime, its remnants or SCAF 
- Deceived revolutionaries 
- Wasted revolutionary gains 
 
3. Conspiracy/treason 
- having hidden agendas 
- depending on unknown/external sources of finance 
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- having secret ties with foreign parties (including countries like Qatar, 
Hamas, US, Saudi Arabia, Gulf Countries) 
- having outside roots, or affiliated with an international network 
 
4. Anti-modernity/threat to Egyptian culture/backwardness frame 
- medieval in their lifestyle and thinking,  
- vulgar and intolerant fanatics 
- against culture, arts and literature 
- Threat to Egyptian culture and identity 
- Reason behind sectarian clashes, threat to national unity 
- Need to be modernized 
- Blindly obey their leaders 
- primitive, simple-minded, ignorant, easily deceived 
 
5. Internal Conflict 
- Old guards and new guards 
- Youth rebelling against leaders 
- Denial/condemnation of another Islamist position 
- Parties internal division and splits 
- Disagreement among different Islamists 
 
6. Hypocrisy (nonreligious – using religion to reach power) 
- Deceive people by religious symbols 
- Corrupt (financially, administratively, or morally) 
- Exploit people needs (election bribers) 
- Accept un-Islamic deeds (like IMF loan, licensing cabaret)  
- Don‘t apply Shari‘ah 
- Liars 
- Against Al-Azhar 
 
7. Anti-democracy 
- Power seekers, and interest-driven   
- threaten civil state, or advocate a theological state 
- force views on others  
- Dictators 
- Assault judiciary/ judiciary independence 
- Rush up with the constitution 
- Oppress their opponents 
- Brotherhoodization of the state 
 
8. Politically organized 
- Plan for elections early 
- Well-organized (in a positive or neutral manner) 
- Lobby for their demands 
- Reach out to influential people 
141 
 
- Engage in political coalitions 
 
9. Polarization Frame 
- Egypt is divided to conflicting pro and anti camps 
- Protest and counter protests 
 
10. Reconciliation Frame 
- Multiples forces 
- avoiding clash 
- Condemning wrong acts (like violence) 
- United in national and issues  
 
11. Victims of Mubarak regime and his state security apparatus 
  
142 
 
APPENDIX B: INTERCODER RELIABILITY 
 
N cases: 29 
N variables: 27 
N coders per variable: 2 
 
# Variable Name % 
Agreement 
Scott's Pi Krippendorff's 
Alpha 
(nominal) 
1 Date  100% 1 1 
2 Newspaper 100% 1 1 
3 Topic 96.6% 0.958 0.959 
4 MB mentioned 100% 1 1 
5 Al-Noor mentioned 96.6% 0.93 0.931 
6 Other Salafi mentioned 96.6% 0.653 0.659 
7 Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya mentioned 100% 1 1 
8 Abu Ismail mentioned 100% 1 1 
9 Al-Wasat mentioned 100% undefined* undefined* 
10 Abu ElFotouh mentioned 100% 1 1 
11 Al-Hay‘a Al-Shariyya mentioned 100% undefined* undefined* 
12 Islamists in general mentioned 93.1% 0.812 0.815 
13 Photo Content 100% 1 1 
14 Reference to Islamists 96.6% 0.874 0.876 
15 Reference to opponents 89.7% 0.862 0.865 
16 Islamists sourced 89.7% 0.776 0.78 
17 Neutral sourced 89.7% 0.73 0.735 
18 Anti-Islamists sourced 96.6% 0.931 0.932 
19 Direction to MB 96.6% 0.947 0.948 
20 Direction to Al-Noor 93.1% 0.873 0.875 
21 Direction to other Salafi 100% 1 1 
22 Direction to Al-Gama‘a Al-
Islamiyya 
100% 1 1 
23 Direction to Abu Ismail 100% 1 1 
24 Direction to Al-Wasat 100% undefined* undefined* 
25 Direction to Abu El-Fotouh 100% 1 1 
26 Direction to Al-Hay‘a Al-Shariyya 100% undefined* undefined* 
27 Dominant Frame 82.8% 0.79 0.793 
*Scott's pi, Cohen's kappa, and Krippendorff's Alpha are undefined for this variable due 
to invariant values. 
 
 
 
 
